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T HE so-called "war on drugs" was officially declared by President
Reagan in 1982,2 although it had started earlier under the pressure of
public concerns about drug abuse. The label "war" is appropriate, for it has
involved very aggressive law enforcement, very harsh punishments, and an
absolute horde of prisoners. It would be difficult to overstate the "war's"
contribution to the nation's inmate population, which now stands at 2.31
million,3 the highest in the world:
The number of people in jail and prison for drug law violations increased
from 50,000 in 1980 to almost 500,000 today. That total is greater than the
total number of people incarcerated for all criminal offenses in western
Europe (whose population exceeds that of the United States by roughly
100 million).4
i Charles S. Cassis Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 196o, Berea College;
J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky.
2 MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON
DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY i, 3 (2007), available at http://www.sentencing-
project.org/doc/publications/ dps25yearquagmire.pdf.
3 See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, ONE IN I OO: BEHIND
BARS IN AMERICA zoo8 I, 5 (2oo8), available at http://www.pewcenterfonthestates.org ("The
United States incarcerates more people than any country in the world, including the far more
populous nation of China. At the start of the new year, the American penal system held more
than 2.3 million adults. China was second, with 1.5 million people behind bars, and Russia
was a distant third with 890,000 inmates .... ").
4 Ethan A. Nadelmann, Criminologists and Punitive Drug Prohibition: To Serve or to
Challenge?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 441,442 (2004) (citing MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING
SENTENCING PROJECT, DISTORTED PRIORITIES: DRUG OFFENDERS IN STATE PRISONS 1 (2002),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/ doc/publications/dp-distortedpriorities.pdf).
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The most striking pattern ... is the growth in the incarceration of drug
offenders. Over the seventeen year range of our analysis, drugs evolved
from being an offense with nearly the fewest prisoners to the one with by
far the most prisoners ....-I
The "war" has been waged through laws that aim their harshest punishments
at big time players in the illegal drug business but miss most of those targets
and produce an inmate population that is overwhelmingly dominated by
drug abusers and bit players in the illegal drug trade:
It has been noted ... that drug arrests have tripled since 1980, with more
than four-fifths being for simple possession violations; ... and that most
of the women and men in federal prisons for drug offenses are first-time,
nonviolent offenders, who were arrested for having small amounts of drugs
for personal use .... 6
In 2005, four of five (81.7%) drug arrests were for possession and one of five
(18.3%) for sales. Overall, 42.6% of drug arrests were for marijuana offenses
7
The "war on drugs" has been blamed for great differences in the
imprisonment of black and white citizens8 and for an explosion in the
5 Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 198o-1996, 26
CRIME & JUST. 17, 20 (1999). See also Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?,
I I STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 9, io-I I (1999) ("From I98o to 1995, the number of drug arrests
nearly tripled ... while the proportion of drug offenders in state prison populations rose from
6.4 percent to 22.7 percent. The change in the federal prison system was even more dramatic,
with drug offenders rising from zS.z percent of the inmate population in 198o to 59.9 per-
cent in 1995.") (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1994 I, 11 (1996); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995 1, 10 (1997)).
6 James A. Inciardi, Policy Issues in the Sentencing of Drug Offenders, 3 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL'Y 397, 397 (2004) (citing Glenn Backes, Abandoning the 'Drug-Fre America' Myth,
ALTERNET.ORG, Nov. 19, 2003, http://www.alternet.orglstory/17228; Meda Chesney-Lind,
Imprisoning Women: The Unintended Victims of Mass Imprisonment, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:
TIE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 79, 88-89 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE
CAN Do ABOUT IT. A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 45 (2001); BARRY STIMMEL,
DRUG ABUSE AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA: THE WAR THAT MUST BE WON I I o (1996); SAMUEL
WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS: A POLICY GUIDE 9 (4th ed. 1998)).
7 MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 3 (citing FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005 (2oo6),
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/o5cius/arrests/index.html).
8 Recent incarceration rates (inmates measured against the population) show the nation
holding one white male above age eighteen for every io6 white adults in the population while
holding one black male above age eighteen for every fifteen black adults in the population.
See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 6 (citing WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
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female population of jails and prisons:
The explosion of both the prison population and its racial disparity are
largely attributable to aggressive street-level enforcement of the drug laws
and harsh sentencing of drug offenders .... 9
Women now represent the fastest growing group of incarcerated persons.
In 2001, they were more than three times as likely to end up in prison as
in 1974, largely due to their low-level involvement in drug-related activity
and the deeply punitive sentencing policies aimed at drugs .... 10
The "war" is fostered by a substantial public appetite for illegal drugs."
It is fueled by a belief that harsh punishments can dampen that appetite
and reduce or eliminate the devastating damage to offenders, families, and
communities that is caused by drug abuse. This approach has survived for
more than thirty years because of the legitimacy of its objective and not
because of the wisdom of its strategy.
Doubts about the wisdom of using harsh punishment as a way of dealing
with the nation's drug problem have prevailed in some circles from the
onset of the "war," partly because of the sheer magnitude of the problem:
In 1991, there were over 6 million cocaine users, 5.7 million users of
hallucinogens and inhalants, and approximately 700,000 heroin users.
According to one estimate, only about one-eighth of the hard-core cocaine
and heroin abusers are now incarcerated. If we add the "non-user" offenders
to these "user" offenders, there are so many offenders that it is fiscally and
practically unrealistic to incarcerate more than a small number of them.'z
Such doubts continue to dominate the thoughts of most scholars, although
they are now more likely to be tied to the difficulty of fighting the "war" than
to the size of the abuser population and the magnitude of the problem:
The key distinction between drug incarcerations and the use of prison for
2oo6 (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjimo6.pdf)).
9 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2004).
10 JAMES AUSTIN ETAL., UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND How TO REDUCE AMERICA'S PRISON
POPULATION 1 (2007). See also MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 13.
I I Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L.
REv. 335, 339 (1995) ("A i99I survey revealed that 74.4 milion (36.2%) of Americans aged
twelve and older reported using an illegal drug at least once during their lifetime.... For
those adults under the age of twenty-five, an estimated iS.8% have used cocaine at least
once, and for those between the ages of twenty-six and thirty-four, an estimated 25.2% have
used cocaine.").
12 Id. at 367-68 (internal citations omitted).
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most other offenses relates to the "replacement effect" that comes into play
in drug cases. In an extreme case, when a serial rapist is incarcerated there
are no additional rapists produced to take on the opportunity to engage in
these violent offenses. But when a street corner drug seller is imprisoned,
it is far from clear that there is any immediate impact on drug selling. As
long as a market for drugs exists in that neighborhood, there is an almost
endless supply of potential sellers willing and able to enter this potentially
lucrative market.
13
Now, thirty years into the "war," views about the law's reliance on
punishment to fix the drug problem are less conciliatory and more absolute:
"[t]he notion that 'the drug war is a failure' has become the common
wisdom in academic ... circles." 4 Those who have most closely studied
the results of the "war" believe that it has "accomplished little more than
incarcerating hundreds of thousands of individuals whose only crime was
the possession of drugs."'" More importantly, they believe that it has had
little if any effect on the drug problem: "Despite the fact that the number
of persons in prison or jail today for drug offenses is more than ten times the
number in 1980, drug use rates remain substantial, with data indicating a
general increase over the past few years."' 6 Needless to say, these scholars
urge law and policy makers to chart a different course.
The "war on drugs" has an almost identical history in the state of
Kentucky. It reared its head in the early 1970s and appears to have involved
some early conflict over the wisdom of using extraordinary punishment
in an effort to control illegal drug use. The conflict occurred during the
course of separate initiatives aimed at reforming then-existing drug laws
(one of which was part of a much larger reform effort that involved all of
the state's criminal laws). 7 The two initiatives produced virtually identical
recommendations on the kinds of drugs that would bring the criminal law
13 Marc Mauer, Thinking About Prison and Its Impact in the Twenty-First Century, 2 OHIo ST.
J. CRIM. L. 607, 613 (2005).
14 Frank 0. Bowman III, The Geology of Drug Policy in 2002, 14 FED. SENT'G REP. 123, 123
(2002).
15 Inciardi, supra note 6, at 397.
16 RYAN S. KING, MARC MAUER & MALCOLM C.YOUNG, SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCER ATION
AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 6 (2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.
org/doc/publications/ inc-iandc-complex.pdf. See also AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 24
("Notwithstanding our extraordinary effort to discourage the use and sale of illegal drugs,
they remain widely available and widely used.").
17 One initiative involved a task force of the Kentucky Crime Commission and the
Legislative Research Commission that was formed for the purpose of drafting a new compre-
hensive penal code for the state and the other initiative involved a group acting under author-
ity of the Kentucky Department of Health that focused solely on criminal laws dealing with
controlled substances. See Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections -Aftershocks
of a "Tough on Crime" Philosophy, 93 Ky. L.J. 305, 352-54 (2004).
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into play and the types of conduct that would be subject to prosecution but
moved in very different directions in fixing punishments for drug offenders.
In one initiative, recommended penalties were moderate by standards of
the time i" and "stopped far short of sending a message that the state was
about to wage a war on the drug epidemic;" 19 in the other, recommended
penalties were higher than existing penalties for both drug and other types
of crimes and high enough to show a new determination to use the power
of punishment in the fight against illegal drugs. The General Assembly
had both sets of recommendations on its agenda in 1972 when its members
decided that it was time to get tougher with drug offenders, firing the first
of many shots in a "war on drugs" that was destined to last for at least three
decades."0
In this early move, the General Assembly did not target all drug
offenders for extraordinary punishment. The 1972 law fixed punishments
for drug offenders at levels that were substantially in line with punishments
imposed on other kinds of offenders at the time.21 But it departed from
its moderation in this regard by enacting sentencing laws that provided
for tougher punishment of drug offenders who had prior drug convictions
(so-called "two-strikes" laws),"2 a departure from proportional punishment
that was meant to manifest a commitment to toughness over tolerance
and to launch Kentucky's version of the "war on drugs" a decade ahead
of President Reagan's widely-known proclamation. And to say the least,
there was substantially more of the same medicine (toughness, intolerance,
disproportionate punishment) beyond the horizon.
18 See id. at 354 ("The penalties for possessing illegal drugs for personal use were at the
misdemeanor level (maximum of twelve months in jail) except for possession of narcotics
drugs listed in the two highest schedules ... which was punished as a class D felony (with a
penalty range of one to five years). The penalties for trafficking in illegal drugs were fixed at
the misdemeanor level for the least dangerous drugs ... at the class D felony range for more
serious drugs ... and at the class C felony range (from five to ten years) for the most serious
drugs....").
19 Id.
20 In the 1972 session, the legislature enacted two major pieces of criminal law legis-
lation. This session repealed virtually all of the existing criminal statutes, enacted a new
comprehensive penal code, but deferred the effective date for two years (and then reenacted
the new comprehensive code in 1974). See Kentucky Penal Code, ch. 385, 1972 Ky. Acts 1653-
1783; Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, 1974 Ky. Acts 831-89. The legislature pulled from the new
comprehensive code all provisions concerning the illegal use of drugs and enacted a separate
and independent set of statutes defining drug crimes. See Kentucky Controlled Substances
Act of 1972, ch. 226, 1972 Ky. Acts 938-66.
21 The penalty ranges were five to ten years in prison for trafficking in high-level narcot-
ics, one to five years for trafficking in high-level non-narcotics, a maximum of one year in jail
for trafficking in low-level drugs and marijuana, one to five years in prison for possession of
high-level narcotics, and a maximum of one year in jail for possession of other types of drugs.




The "war" has had the same kind of impact in Kentucky as it has had
in the country. In the early 1970s, the state had about 3000 inmates in
custody, 2 3 had two prisons for men and a small prison for women, 4 and
had a corrections budget of no more than $10 million. 5 In the spring of
2008, the state had an inmate population of 22,7196 and a very substantial
and growing number of drug offenders within that population, owned and
operated thirteen state prisons and had inmates in three private prisons,
and had a corrections budget of about $450 million.2 7 Under the pressure
of a budget crisis of unprecedented proportions, the state has used an
early release program (under its power over parole) to reduce the inmate
population by about 1000,8 so that by mid-year 2009 it had in custody
21,565 inmates 9 (about seven times as many as it had at the outset of its
war on drugs). Driven mostly by the budget crisis, law and policy makers
have shown some exhaustion with the "war on drugs," but have yet to
do anything to soften the very harsh laws that have flooded the state's
prisons and jails with drug offenders. Without movement in that direction,
notwithstanding crisis-driven early release programs, they will find very
little, if any, meaningful relief from the incarceration addiction that is
reflected in the above numbers.
The state's drug laws have not been overhauled since 197230 and can
fairly be described as a potpourri of disjointed parts, with the most disjointed
of all being the provisions that are used to send drug offenders to prison
for long periods of time. A case can be made for junking the whole set of
laws and starting anew from a clean slate, but, in a lawmaking climate still
dominated by a tough-on-crime philosophy, an easier case can be made
for selective reform aimed at the most indefensible and harmful of these
provisions. In pursuit of the latter objective, I write in this Article about
drug law reforms that could be achieved without jeopardizing public safety,
that would slow and maybe reverse unsustainable growth in the state's
inmate population, and that might provide some momentum for a different
attack on the drug epidemic. As a first step toward these ends, I start with
a discussion of an official acknowledgement that harsh punishment is not
23 See Lawson, supra note 17, at 325 fig-3.
24 See id. at 322 (describing pre-1970 prison construction in Kentucky).
25 Id. at 331 fig.5.
z6 Ky. DEP'T OF CORR., STATEWIDE POPULATION REPORT No. IPTR5oo-I 8 (Mar. 31, 2008)
(unpublished daily count sheet) (on file with author).
27 Robert G. Lawson, PFO Law Reform, A Crucial First Step Toward Sentencing Sanity in
Kentucky, 97 Ky. L.J. 1, 2 (zoo8).
28 Stephanie Steitzer, Early-Release Plan Draws Fire, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.),
Oct. 26, zoo8, at B I.
29 Ky. DEP'T OF CORR., STATEWIDE POPULATION REPORT No. IPTR5oo-18 (July 30, 2009)
(unpublished daily count sheet) (on file with author).
30 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
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the only way to confront the tide of illegal drug abuse.
I. YIlE DRUG COURT MOVEMENT
A. Introduction
One of the earliest signs of exhaustion with the country's predominant
drug abuse strategy was the arrival and very rapid expansion of drug
courts.3" Drug courts differ to some extent from program to program but
most of them look and act something like this:
Most drug court programs last at least one year. During that time
substance abusing offenders are assessed and placed into an appropriate
treatment program. The court monitors both the drug court participant's
progress in treatment and abstinence. By the informed use of sanctions
and rewards, the court motivates the offender to remain in treatment and
complete the program.
32
A drug court disposition is similar to probation and conditional discharge
but contemplates "closer supervision of the drug-using offender"33 and
extraordinary participation in that disposition by the trial judge:
The advent of drug courts signaled a sea-change in American courts-a
paradigm shift from court practices designed for speed and efficiency in
dispensing penalties to court practices designed to prevent future crime by
addressing problems that increase the risk of criminal activity. This shift
to problem-solving courts is based on the premise that courts should try to
advance public safety by preventing future crime among offenders at high
risk of recidivism.
34
A drug court disposition merely defers and suspends an ordinary sentence
in return for successful completion of the treatment program. No one
doubts that a percentage of participants will fail the program and end up
in prison or jail for service of sentence. Still, the drug court movement is
more therapeutic than the strategy it replaces and has at least some chance
of reducing both inmate populations and drug abuse. Nevertheless, it has
not been universally accepted as effective and appropriate.
31 MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 26 (noting the increase in the number of courts "from
their inception in 1989 to j,662 in 2007").
32 William G. Meyer & A. William Ritter, DrugCourts Work, i4 FED. SENT'G REP. 179, 183
(2oo2) (footnotes omitted).
33 Id. at 179.




B. Criticism and Support
Some of the most respected criticisms of drug courts come from doubts
about the benefits of drug treatment obtained under threat of incarceration
and from doubts about the propriety of judicial involvement in activities
that would seem to be more appropriate for social services agencies:
Treatment and rehabilitative programs tend to be most effective
when they are disassociated from government coercion. Someone
who doesn't want to be rehabilitated is not a promising candidate
for being rehabilitated. Requiring someone to sit through a program
designed to deal with dependence on alcohol or drugs may lead
to resentment and shammed participation. It is not likely to bring
about the inner transformation that will end involvement in crime.
3
1
Uncommitted particpants were not seen as the only problem. Judges
expressed skepticism as well:
It is easy in retrospect to overlook how dramatic a departure from
prevailing judicial philosophy Miami's drug court represented in 1989.... In
the larger national court community, Judge Klein's endorsement of treatment
as a court strategy ... was met with an uncomfortable silence. Many judges
... regarded adopting such a philosophy.., as idealistic and impractical.
Probably more judges believed that such court-based treatment intervention
was inappropriate because it appeared to conflict with the judiciary's mission
to serve as neutral arbiter. Further, the helping aim of the drug court struck
many judges as asking the judge to be a "social worker," in essence calling
for an activist, advocacy role that many judges believed would undermine
the professional detachment needed for resolving criminal cases fairly.
36
Some of the strongest criticism of the drug court movement is based on a
yet-to-be-substantiated belief that such courts have inflated rather than
deflated the inmate population (through a practice called "net widening"):
Drug courts don't work, and never have. They don't reduce recidivism
or relapse. Instead, they trigger such massive net widening that they end
up sending many more drug defendants to prison than traditional criminal
courts ever did. Their failures have resulted in a quiet refocusing, from
pre-adjudicative treatment to post-adjudicative treatment. That is, they
have become officially what they have always been unofficially: a form of
35 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note io, at i6 (footnote omitted).




glorified, and terribly expensive, probation. 3
Drug courts don't work for everyone and never will. A certain percentage
of drug court defendants will fail the program and go to prison, and a certain
percentage will pass the program only to go to prison on a later date for new
crimes. But the popularity of the movement continues to grow, in the face
of such criticism as described above and a shortage of reliable research data
on recidivism rates for drug court participants.
3
General assessments of the effectiveness of drug courts are very difficult
because of the challenge of tracking participants long enough to determine
if participation has produced lasting effects. Most studies report positive
results from drug court participation but quite often sound warnings against
unrealistic expectations:
The Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project,
funded by the [U.S.] Department of Justice, has catalogued the experience
of these programs over their first decade of existence in the 1990s. Their
conclusion is that "drug court programs are experiencing a significant
reduction in recidivism among participants," citing rates that range from
5-28%, in comparison to recidivism rates in the range of 50% for non-drug
court drug possession defendants. Similarly, they report that drug use
among drug court participants is "substantially reduced and significantly
lower than that reported for non-drug court defendants."
39
The results should also remind policy makers that drug courts, although
effective for some offenders, are not a magic bullet.... A recent study of
over 2,000 drug court graduates from a national sample of drug courts found
that 16% had been rearrested within a year and 27% within two years. The
message is that we need to be realistic in our expectations about drug court
impact.40
In other words, say the studies, the drug court is better than the failed
incarceration policies of the "war on drugs" but not a panacea for the drug
epidemic and the mass incarceration that has accompanied it.
37 Morris B. Hoffman, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14 FED. SENT'G
REP. 172, 172 (2o02).
38 See Harrell, supra note 34, at 207 ("Despite the popularity of drug courts, the scientific
basis for assessing their impact on public safety, efficient use of criminal justice resources, and
therapeutic outcomes for participants has been weak.").
39 KING & MAUER, supra note 4, at 15.
40 Harrell, supra note 34, at 208 (citation omitted).
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C. The Kentucky Experience
The drug court made its initial appearance in Kentucky in the
mid-1990s, has experienced rapid growth, and now exists in forty-three
Circuit Courts (covering 115 of the state's 120 counties). 4' It is described
as a "specialty court"42 and appears to operate like drug courts in other
jurisdictions, seeking to substitute drug treatment for incarceration and
requiring "judges to step beyond their traditionally independent and
objective arbiter roles and develop new expertise. ' 43 It is open to persons
who commit nonviolent "drug or drug-related crimes," lasts for a period of
eighteen months (for those who graduate), and like other such programs
involves a submission to drug treatment under a threat of incarceration.
44
The Court of Justice (on its Web site) says that its drug courts have
graduated 2148 individuals (as of June 30, 2007) and then claims in
unequivocal terms that "drug court works. '45 It reports that drug court
is less costly than incarceration ($3083 for a year in drug court versus
$17,194 for a year in prison) and significantly more effective in controlling
crime (20% recidivism rate after two years for drug court graduates versus
57% rate for drug offenders placed on regular probation), all leading to its
conclusion that drug courts are "a shining example of Kentucky's success
in specialty courts." 46
In assessing these results, drug court critics will notice that a very
significant portion of the participants in the drug court program do not
graduate 47 and that the court's recidivism comparisons do not extend beyond
the two years after graduation, factors that have caused the best authorities
on drug courts to warn against expecting too much from the drug court
alternative to incarceration. Still, given the fact that "two-thirds of drug
41 Ky. COURT OF JUSTICE, KENTUCKY DRUG COURT: SAVING COSTS, SAVING LIVES, MAP OF
SITES, http://www.courts.ky.gov/stateprograms/drugcourt/drugcourtsitemap.htm (last visited
Oct. 29, 20o9).
42 Ky. COURT OF JUSTICE, KENTUCKY DRUG COURT: SAVING COSTS, SAVING LIVES, OVERVIEW,
http://www.courts.ky.gov/stateprograms/drugcourt/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
43 Id.; Ky. COURT OF JUSTICE, IO KEY COMPONENTS OF DRUG COURT, http://www.courts.
ky.gov/ stateprograms/drugcourt/components.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
44 See Ky. COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 42.
45 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Ky. COURT OF JUSTICE, KENTUCKY DRUG COURT: SAVING
COSTS, SAVING LIVES 1 (2007), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/o8o5sentenceres9.
pdf.
46 Id. at 1-2.
47 The Court's most recent data shows a graduation rate of about 41 % (with 7876 partici-
pants, 4531 terminated or administratively discharged, and 3219 graduates). See E-mail from
Connie M. Payne, Executive Officer, Kentucky Drug Court, to Robert G. Lawson, Professor




offenders leaving state prison will be re-arrested within three years," 4 the
court seems justified in seeing drug courts as an attractive alternative to
using prisons and jails as a solution to the drug epidemic.
D. Conclusion
The drug court is a promising development, if only because it reflects
a major change of attitude toward drug offenders and some recognition of
the drug war's failure. But it would be a huge mistake to see the drug court
as anything more than a tiny retreat from the laws and policies that have
filled our prisons and jails with low-level drug offenders. In an important
study entitled Unlocking America, the JFA Institute issued a reminder that
deserves and needs more attention and appreciation in law reform circles
than it usually gets:
This generation-long growth of imprisonment has occurred not because
of growing crime rates, but because of changes in sentencing policy that
resulted in dramatic increases in the proportion of felony convictions
resulting in prison sentences and in the length-of-stay in prison that those
sentences required. Prison populations have been growing steadily for a
generation, although the crime rate is today about what it was in 197.3 when
the prison boom started.49
We incarcerate more people than any country on earth, says this Institute,
because our criminal penalties are harsher than they have ever been and
harsher than penalties in other parts of the world; 0 "it is important to be
clear about this"'" when thinking about law reform, says the Institute, and
even more important to be clear about this:
The fundamental and most powerful reform that must occur if we are to
48 DOUG MCVAY, VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST.,
TREATMENT OR INCARCERATION? NATIONAL AND STATE FINDINGS ON THE EFFICACY AND COST
SAVINGS OF DRUG TREATMENT VERSUS IMPRISONMENT 18 (2004). See also Cassia Spohn & David
Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Reddivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug
Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329,350-51 (2002) ("lWle found compelling evidence that offend-
ers who were sentenced to prison had higher rates of recidivism and recidivated more quickly
than offenders placed on probation. Consistent with the conclusions of McGuire and Priestly
(1995), our findings suggest that punitive measures like incarceration 'have a net destructive
effect, in that they serve primarily to worsen rates of recidivism."').
49 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note Io, at I.
50 Id. at 4 ("For the same crimes, American prisoners receive sentences twice as long
as English prisoners, three times as long as Canadian prisoners, four times as long as Dutch
prisoners, five to Io times as long as French prisoners, and five times as long as Swedish pris-
oners.").
51 Id. at 15.
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have any hope of reversing the imprisonment binge is to reduce the severity
of the sentences [criminal defendants] are given.5
The drug court movement reduces the need for this kind of reform to
some extent, for it provides relief from incarceration for at least some drug
offenders. But it provides no such relief for a much larger number (the
two-thirds who flunk drug court, the 20% who recidivate within two years
of graduation, and the many who are not eligible to participate) and leaves
this number subject to the very harsh penalties of existing drug laws. The
number of drug offenders in the state's inmate population has continued to
grow by leaps and bounds since the start of Kentucky's drug court, 3 leaving
no doubt that a more "powerful reform" of drug laws will be needed for
reversal of this important part of Kentucky's "imprisonment binge."
4
II. A SKETCH OF THE DRUG LAWS
A. Introduction
Since the early 1970s, the Kentucky General Assembly has given the
state's drug laws the same kind of attention it has given to the rest of the
state's criminal laws, plenty of ad hoc legislation sponsored by tough-on-
crime advocates and enacted under a belief that harsh punishment is the
right answer (and the only answer) to the drug problem. Lawmakers have
delivered to crime fighters most of the sentencing weapons requested and in
so doing have created a hodgepodge of broad, overlapping, and sometimes
senseless crimes. The end product is a set of laws that are brutally harsh,
destined to produce lengthy imprisonments for large numbers of people
who pose very little risk to others, and come together to form a very
powerful engine for prison growth.
B. The Foundation
The state's drug laws have roots that go back to the 1972 enactment
described above and beyond that to a model statute known as the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act that came into existence in 1970 and underpins
the drug laws of most states.5" The 1972 General Assembly borrowed from
52 Id. at 23.
53 See charts infra pp. 26o-61.
54 Id.
55 Compare Kentucky Controlled Substances Act of 1972, ch. z26, 1972 Ky. Acts 938, with
UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCEs ACT §§ 101-710,9 U.L.A. 13 (1994). The Uniform Controlled
Substances Act was adopted in 197o by the National Conference of Commissioners of




the model statute most of what then constituted the foundation of the
state's criminal law on drugs: (1) an identification of the drugs that bring
the criminal law into play, (2) a classification of these drugs in accordance
with their potential for abuse ("Schedules"), and (3) provisions defining
criminal law prohibitions against the sale and use of such drugs (so-called
basic drug crimes) and fixing penalties for violations.5 6 The 2009 drug
laws rest on the same foundation (and a more recent model still called the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act).
The existing statutes list all drugs that are subject to criminal penalties,
rank them against each other according to their potential for abuse, and use
this ranking to create five schedules that are then used to define crimes and
set penalty ranges. Schedules I and II are filled with drugs having "high
potential for abuse,"57 Schedule III consists of drugs having less "potential
for abuse,"5" and Schedules IV and V include drugs having a "low potential
for abuse."5 9 Schedules I and II contain the drugs that are most likely to be
abused (heroin, cocaine, amphetamine, methamphetamine, morphine, and
marijuana),6° most likely to produce criminal prosecutions, and most likely
to produce lengthy periods of imprisonment.
61
The existing statutes create two sets of basic drug crimes: one that is
aimed at the sale or distribution of drugs, and one that is aimed at drug users.
The first set includes three degrees of trafficking in controlled substances
(the highest degree for Schedule I and II narcotic drugs, the next highest
for Schedule I and II non-narcotic drugs and Schedule III drugs, and the
lowest for Schedules IV and V drugs) 6 and a special trafficking offense for
marijuana.63 The sentencing regime for these and other drug offenses is
identical to the regime that governs offenses defined in the Penal Code
(a penalty range for each offense and authority to sentence a defendant to
any penalty within that range)64; ordinary penalties for trafficking crimes
(unenhanced as discussed below) are substantial at the highest level (five
to ten years for first degree) 6 , moderate at the lowest level (a maximum
of twelve months in jail for third degree)66, and generally in line with the
penalties for other types of crime.
The legislature has done much the same in its creation of crimes aimed
56 See Kentucky Controlled Substances Act.
57 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.o4o, .o6o (LexisNexis 2007).
58 Id. § zi8A.o8o.
59 Id. §§ 218A.ioo, 120.
6o Id. §§ 218A.o5o, .070.
6I Id. §§ z18A.I41 5, .416, .1421, .1422.
62 Id. §§ 218A.1412-.1414.
63 Id. § 218A.142I.
64 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060 (LexisNexis 2008).
65 See id.
66 See id. § 532.o9o.
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at drug users. The statutes define three degrees of possession of controlled
substances 67 and then define a special possession offense for marijuana. 
6
They impose felony penalties (one to five years in prison) on only the
most serious of these offenses (committed by possession of narcotic drugs
from Schedules I and II) and punish the rest as high-level misdemeanors
(maximum penalty of twelve months in jail).69 The penalties for possession
(unenhanced) are lower across the board than the penalties for trafficking
(unenhanced) and, if left alone, would send more inmates to jail than to
prison and would send them to jail for short stays (no more than one year).
Not many have been left alone.
C. Bulking Up the Foundation
1. Introduction.- The drug law foundation described above was put
in place in the early 1970s when the state of Kentucky had about 3000
inmates 0 and no addiction to incarceration. It is unimaginable that the
"trafficking" and "possession" crimes of this time (and described above)
could have produced an inmate population capable of filling several prisons
for men and one for women. But this we can never know, for the state
has spent much of the last thirty-five years building stronger weapons
for use against drug offenders and a vastly different landscape for drug
prosecutions. It has done a wide variety of things to extend the already
long arms of the drug laws, and in so doing has virtually guaranteed an
explosive growth of the state's inmate population.
2. Extended Coverage.- "Trafficking" and "possession" reach far enough
into the pool of illegal drug activities to ensnare manufacturers, wholesalers,
retailers, possessors, users, and accomplices (or, to put it differently,
to blanket the entire pool). But in pursuit of harsher punishments for
certain types of traffickers and possessors, drug enforcers have sought and
obtained special crimes to supplement the "moderate" punitive punch of
the basic coverage drug crimes. Longer prison terms and more inmates for
state incarceration (and very significant contributions to the state's inmate
explosion) are traceable to these crimes, sometimes well in excess of what
might have been anticipated by lawmakers.
The offenses of selling drugs to a minor 1 and trafficking in drugs within
1000 yards of a school7" are very good examples of such crimes. The first
67 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.1415-.1417 (LexisNexis 2007) (using the Schedules
exactly as they are used in defining the "trafficking" crimes).
68 Id. § 2!8A. 1422.
69 See id.; see also id. §§ z18A.1415-.1417.
70 Lawson, supra note 17, at 325.
71 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.I4O1 (LexisNexis 2007).
72 Id. § zi8A.1411.
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one prohibits a sale or transfer of drugs to a minor by an adult (to one under
eighteen by one over eighteen), conduct covered by the basic trafficking
crimes described above and punished severely for the most abusive drugs
(as a Class C felony), moderately for less abusive drugs (a Class D felony),
and lightly for the least abusive drugs (a Class A misdemeanor). 3 The
special offense is punished severely without regard to the type of drug
involved in the transaction (as a Class C felony),74 thus it generates longer
prison terms for offenders who sell or transfer moderately abusive drugs to
minors, and it generates more inmates for state incarceration by converting
misdemeanor penalties (twelve months in jail) into Class C felony penalties
(five to ten years in prison) for offenders who sell the least abusive drugs
to minors (including any amount of marijuana). 5 In other words, it has
the capability of enhancing punishments ten-fold for certain offenders,
from a maximum of twelve months in jail to a minimum of five years and a
maximum of ten years in prison, numbers that are capable of filling prison
beds rapidly.
The offense of trafficking in drugs within 1000 yards of a school is a close
cousin to selling drugs to a minor, aimed at the same objective (protecting
children from drug sellers) and enacted into law in the same piece of
legislation. 6 Like its cousin, it duplicates coverage of the basic trafficking
crimes and is significant because of its impact on punishment (some of
which is obvious and anticipated and some of which is probably not). It
criminalizes drug sales and transfers and possessions with intent to sell or
transfer ("trafficking"), creates but one offense for all controlled substances
(making no distinction between highly abusive and lowly abusive drugs),
and classifies it as a Class D felony (one to five years in prison) unless it
would be punished at a higher level by the basic trafficking offenses." Its
effect, obvious and anticipated, is to convert conduct that would ordinarily
be punished as misdemeanor crimes (third degree trafficking and trafficking
in small amounts of marijuana) into felony crimes, sending offenders to
prison for long terms rather than sending them to jail for short terms.
In providing this weapon, lawmakers must surely have been thinking
about drug dealers peddling drugs to school children (for they named it
"trafficking in or near a school"). But look at what they did in defining the
offense:
1. It covers persons transferring drugs to fifty-year-old drug addicts having
no connections to a school.
2. It covers illegal drug activities that occur within 1000 yards (or ten
73 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
74 § zi8A.1422.
75 Id.
76 Act of Apr. 13, 1992, ch.441, §§ 11, 21, 1992 Ky. Acts 1316, 1325, 1327.
77 § 218A.41 .
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football fields or ten city blocks) of a school or, to put it realistically, that
occur anywhere inside the city limits of Lexington, Louisville, Covington,
Owensboro, etc.
3. It covers not just drug peddlers but also persons found in possession of
drugs within 1000 yards (or within ten city blocks) of a school and subject to
an accusation that they have intent to transfer them to somebody (perhaps
a fifty-year-old addict having no connection to a school) at some point in
the future.
4. It can be used in conjunction with its "cousin" (selling drugs to a minor)
to obtain two felony convictions (and two separate punishments) for a single
act of selling or giving low-level drugs or small amounts of marijuana to a
minor within ten city blocks of a school.7"
Lawmakers almost surely did not mean to open the door to these expansive
uses (or exploitation) of the offense and to elevated punishments for
offenders having very little, if any, resemblance to persons peddling drugs
on school grounds. But they did open that door and, as discussed in Part IV,
drug law enforcers have entered.
Some of the special crimes in the drug laws seem to serve almost no
purpose other than the enhancement of punishment for drug offenders.
The offense called theft of a controlled substance79 is an example. It is
defined exactly as the general offense of theft is defined (unlawful taking
of another's property with an intent to steal 80) except that it requires a
taking of controlled substances, meaning that any person committing the
special crime would simultaneously commit general theft. Without the
special crime, such a taking could be prosecuted as theft and punished as
thefts are punished (as a Class D felony if the property was worth $500 and
a Class A misdemeanor if worth less than $500);8i with the special offense,
the taking is prosecuted as theft of a controlled substance and punished
as a Class D felony no matter what it was worth and as a Class C felony if
found to be worth $300 or more."2 Did lawmakers see a need for greater
protection of the property interests of illegal drug possessors (the reason for
theft offenses) or did they find in the theft an excuse for greater punishment
of drug possessors?
In all cases in which this offense is committed (by taking another's
property), the offender commits the offense of illegal drug possession. If
prosecuted as a possession crime, the taker would be punished as a Class
D felon if he had in his possession the most abusive of all illegal drugs
78 See the "Double Counting" discussion in this subpart of the Article, infra notes 116-
13 1 and accompanying text.
79 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1418 (LexisNexis 2007).





(narcotics from Schedules I and II and some others) 3 and as a Class A
misdemeanor if he had in his possession less abusive substances (from
Schedules I through V).84 If prosecuted as theft, the taker would be subject
to the same punishment in a few instances (for a taking of less than $500
worth of the most abusive drugs) but to significantly greater punishment
in most instances; in some cases, Class D felonies would convert into
Class C felonies (for a taking of $300 worth of the most abusive drugs),
while in others Class A misdemeanors would convert into Class D felonies
(producing longer sentences and time in prison rather than jail for possessors
of low-level drugs and small amounts of marijuana). And there is some
extra enhancement of punishment probably not anticipated by lawmakers,
resulting from the fact that a single act of unlawful taking of an illegal drug
would simultaneously support two convictions and two sentences (one for
theft of the drug and one for possession of the same drug).8 5
The list of special drug crimes extends beyond these three to include
all of the following: theft of anhydrous ammonia (a substance used in
methamphetamine), 6 knowingly receiving stolen anhydrous ammonia, 7
forgery of a prescription,8 8 possession of a forged prescription,8 9 theft of a
prescription blank,' criminal conspiracy to traffic in a controlled substance,9'
and controlled substance endangerment to a child.9 They duplicate crimes
that are generally defined in the penal code, 93 overlap the drug crime of
possession in some instances, 94 and appear to exist mostly if not solely for
enhancement of punishment for persons involved in illegal drug activities.
Like the three situations described earlier, they produce longer sentences
83 Seeid. § 218A.1415.
84 Seeid. §§ 218A.I416,.1417,.1422.
85 See the "Double Counting" discussion in this subpart of the Article, infra notes 116-
131 and accompanying text.
86 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5 14.030(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2008).
87 Id. § 514.I10(3)(b), amendedby Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. io6, § 13, 2oo9 Ky. Acts 1177,
1182-83 (renumbering subsection (3)(b) as (3)(d)).
88 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.z82 (LexisNexis 2007).
89 Id. § 218A.284.
90 Id. § 218A.286.
91 Id. § 218A.14o2.
92 Id. §§ 218A.144i-.i444.
93 For example, the crimes of forgery of a prescription and possession of a forged pre-
scription are carbon copies of the crime of forgery in the third degree and criminal possession
of forged instruments in the third degree. Compare § 218A.282, and § 218A.284, with Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 5 6.O4O (LexisNexis 2oo8), and id. § 5 16.070.
94 For example, a defendant could not commit theft (an unlawful taking) of anhydrous
ammonia without simultaneously committing possession of that substance and could not com-
mit receiving stolen anhydrous ammonia without committing possession of that substance.
See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A. 1415 (LexisNexis 2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.030(2)(b)
(LexisNexis 2oo8); id. § 514.110(3)(b), amendedby Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. io6, § 13, 2009 Ky.
Acts 1177, 1182-83 (renumbering subsection (3)(b) as (3)(d)).
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for some offenders, prison rather than jail for others, and unquantifiable but
undeniable increases in the state's inmate population.
D. Multiplying Punishments
1. Repeat Offenders.- If there existed no repeat offender laws applicable to
drug offenders, a defendant standing convicted of possession of cocaine
(or some other highly abusive drug) would be subjected to the penalties
imposed by the state's penal code on Class D felons; a sentencing authority
(jury or judge) would work from the penalty range for Class D felonies (one
to five years) 95 in sentencing the defendant to a fixed term of years within
the range (e.g., two years), and the defendant would be committed to prison
to serve that term (unless earlier released by action of parole authorities).
Similarly, a defendant standing convicted of trafficking in small amounts of
marijuana (or possession of some lowly abusive drug other than marijuana)
would be subject to penalties imposed by the penal code on Class A
misdemeanants; a sentencing authority would work from the penalty range
for these offenses (maximum of twelve months in jail)96 in sentencing
the defendant to a fixed term within the range (e.g., six months), and the
defendant would be committed to jail to serve that sentence. In these
scenarios and all others involving drug offenders, the penal code's use of
penalty ranges provides room for the imposition of greater punishment on
repeat offenders (e.g., five years for the possessor of cocaine and twelve
months in jail for the trafficker in small amounts of marijuana), without
assistance from special repeat offender laws that now dominate the state's
drug statutes.
Both of the crimes described above (possession of cocaine and trafficking
in small amounts of marijuana) are subject to a special repeat offender law
(covering anyone convicted of a "second or subsequent [drug] offense" 97),
the effect of which is to push the convicted defendant into a higher penalty
range for purposes of sentencing. Upon a second conviction, the possessor
of cocaine is subject to the penalties imposed by the penal code on Class
C felons (five to ten years),9 meaning that his sentencing authority would
have to give him five years in prison and could give him as many as ten.
And the convicted trafficker in small amounts of marijuana is subject to
the penalties imposed by the penal code on Class D felons (one to five
years in prison),' meaning that he is headed for prison rather than jail and
95 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.o6o(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2oo8).
96 Id. § 532.090(1).
97 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A-o o(3 5 ) (LexisNexis 2007) (liberally defining a prior con-
viction for purposes of drug laws as any conviction "under this chapter, or under any statute of
the United States, or of any state relating to substances classified as controlled substances").




potentially for a period that could be five times as long as the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed on him as a first time drug offender.
And the punishment enhancements for these hypothetical offenders are
very much the rule rather than the exception under Kentucky law, for the
General Assembly has attached repeat offender provisions like these to
virtually all of its drug crimes, even those that exist for no purpose other
than enhancement of punishment (e.g., selling drugs to a minor)." The
end result is a very substantial contribution to the size and growth of the
state's inmate population, some by producing longer sentences and some
by converting misdemeanors into felonies.
2. Double Enhancements.- The state's drug statutes, sometimes alone and
sometimes in conjunction with other laws, authorize or tolerate the practice
of enhancing already enhanced punishments. One of the most important
of such enhancements, and probably the most indefensible, flows from the
combined effect of the state's persistent felony offender (PFO) law and
the "two-strikes" provisions of the drug statutes. When put together, the
two laws totally destroy the principle of proportional punishment ("an eye
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth") and send drug offenders to prison for
periods that used to be reserved for society's worst actors. They do so as
described below.
As stated above, a convicted possessor of cocaine (or some other highly
abusive drug) is ordinarily punished as a Class D felon (a term of not less
than one nor more than five years in prison)1"' and a convicted trafficker in
small amounts of marijuana is punished as a Class A misdemeanant (jail
confinement for no more than twelve months).0 I As also stated above, with
an earlier drug conviction, the cocaine possessor is punished as a Class C
felon (not less than five nor more than ten years)0 3 and the trafficker in
small amounts of marijuana is punished as a Class D felon (not less than
one nor more than five years).' °4 Should the defendants have on their
records a felony conviction not used for the first enhancement (such as
theft, forgery, knowingly receiving stolen property, etc.), they face the
possibility of prosecution under the persistent felony offender law and a
second enhancement of their punishments: the convicted cocaine possessor
would now be punishable as a Class B felon (not less than ten nor more
than twenty years in prison) l"5 and the small-amount marijuana trafficker
would be punishable as a Class C felon (not less than five nor more than
ioo See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A. 1401(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
101 § 532.o6o(2)(d).
102 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.090(l) (LexisNexis 2008).
103 § 532.o6o(2)(C).
104 § 532.o60(2)(d).
IO5 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.O60(2)(b) (LexisNexis zoo8).
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ten years in prison)."°6 Although the "two-strikes" laws of the drug statutes
are exact duplicates of the "two-strikes" provision of the persistent felony
offender law, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled in 1985 that the two can
be used independently to enhance punishments."°7 Through inaction,
the General Assembly has put its seal of approval on that decision and
also on one approving the use of the two statutes where the defendant's
prior convictions were both for drug crimes (with one enhancing under
the "two-strikes" drug law and the other enhancing under the persistent
felony offender law). 108
A more extensive form of double enhancement is hidden in some of the
special crimes enacted during the "war on drugs" in an attempt to provide
for tougher penalties on targeted groups of traffickers and possessors. For
example, if a person sells a lowly abusive drug (from Schedule IV or V) to a
minor, he commits the offense of selling drugs to a minor and is subjected
to the penalties imposed on Class C felons (five to ten years in prison)°9;
if he had sold this drug to an adult, he would have committed third degree
trafficking and would have been punished as a Class A misdemeanant
(maximum of twelve months in jail), 110 showing that sellers to minors suffer
a major enhancement of punishment as a targeted group of drug traffickers.
And, should he commit this offense after a prior drug conviction, he finds
himself facing a second enhancement and a penalty range that is reserved
for Class B felons (ten to twenty years in prison),"' a result that produces
a sentence that is at least ten times and maybe as much as twenty times
the maximum punishment that could have been imposed without the
enhancements. Significant growth in the inmate population is an inevitable
consequence of multiple enhancements like this one, and selling drugs to a
minor is not the only special drug offense with this characteristic.' 2
Then, on top of this, adding enhancement to enhancement, is a statute
that pushes penalty ranges for all drug crimes one level higher for all
offenders who possess firearms during the commission of drug offenses." 3
Should our seller to a minor have both an earlier drug conviction
(qualifying him for a ten to twenty year sentence) and possession of a gun
io6 § 532.o6o(2)(c).
107 See Commonwealth v. Grimes, 698 S.W.zd 836,837 (Ky. 1985).
io8 See Morrow v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Ky. 2002).
io9 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.O60(2)(C) (LexisNexis zoo8).
iio Id. § 532.090(l).
i ii Id. § 53z.o6o(2)(b).
112 For instance, a defendant who could be prosecuted for possession in the third de-
gree (maximum of twelve months in jail) might instead be prosecuted for theft of controlled
substances (one to five years in prison) and face the possibility of double enhancement if
the value of the drugs exceeds $300 (five to ten years in prison). See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
2I8A.1417-.1418 (LexisNexis 2007).
113 Id. § 218A.992.
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when concluding the sale, he moves into the penalty range reserved for
Class A felons and is subject to imprisonment for not less than twenty nor
more than fifty years, or life imprisonment.'1 4 The firearm enhancement
provision extends to all drug offenders (and especially to all traffickers and
possessors), allows for the enhancement of multiple offenses committed
during a single course of conduct (e.g., possession of cocaine, possession of
marijuana, and possession of some drug paraphernalia, plus possession of a
single firearm),"5 and to an unquantifiable extent adds significantly to the
high percentage of drug offenders in the state's inmate population.
3. Double Counting.- In a number of areas, the state's case law facilitates
aggressive prosecution and punishment of drug offenders and earns some
credit for filling the state's prisons and jails to capacity and beyond. As
explained above, the case law permits duplicate "two-strikes" laws to be
used to doubly enhance punishment of drug offenders," 6 allows possession
of a gun to be used over and over to enhance punishment," 7 and drops
very few if any obstacles to the use of punishment enhancements in drug
prosecutions. Beyond the enhancement area, there is a long list of decisions
that tilt unfavorably to the defense in drug cases," 8 none more important
than those that authorize the prosecution to obtain multiple convictions
and punishments from a single act, episode, or course of criminal conduct
(known in some circles as "double counting" "9 ).
At one time, the state's law was relatively unreceptive to "double
counting," deploying a "single impulse" test to measure the extent of a
defendant's criminality from a single course of criminal conduct. The
controlling authority for this test was Ingram v. Commonwealth,2 0 a drug case
in which the Kentucky Supreme Court was presented with the question of
whether a defendant who had made a single drug sale could be convicted
of both selling drugs to a minor and trafficking within 1000 yards of a school
114 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.o6o(2)(a) (LexisNexis zoo8).
115 See Adams v. Commonwealth, 931 S.W.2d 465,468 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
i 16 See Commonwealth v. Grimes, 698 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. 1985).
117 See Adams, 931 S.W 2d at 468.
i 18 An important example of such case law is a set of decisions describing the proof re-
quirements for an illegal possession prosecution (the most common of all drug prosecutions);
these decisions allow conviction without proof that the defendant had enough drugs for either
personal use or for transfer to another for personal use (requiring no more than a "trace" or
"residue" of the controlled substance). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shively, 814 S.W2d 572 ,
574 (Ky. 1991) (presence of cocaine residue in test tube is sufficient to support a possession
charge); Bolen v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W 3 d 907, 909 (Ky. zooo) (not even a "measurable
amount" is required).
I 19 See, e.g., Timothy Cone, Double Jeopardy, Post-Blakely, 41 Am. CRIm. L. REv. 1373,
1383-84 (2004); Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under Many Headings: The Problem of Multiple
Punishment, 29 AM. J. CRiM. L. 245, 268-69 (zooz).
120 Ingram v. Commonwealth, 8oi S.W.2d 321, 321 (Ky. 199o).
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(where evidence of the sale proved all of the elements of both crimes). "[A]
single impulse [or] a single act," said the court, cannot be used to obtain
dual convictions even if the defendant's behavior "was offensive to two
criminal statutes."' 1  Needless to say, while it lasted, Ingram imposed a
significant limitation on the power of the prosecution to break conduct into
pieces in pursuit of harsh punishments. It was overruled in 1996.
In Commonwealth v. Burge,' the Kentucky Supreme Court replaced
the "single impulse" test with one that leaves the prosecution with
substantially more room to lengthen punishments by carving up a single
course of conduct into multiple crimes. Borrowing from a well-known
federal case,"2 3 the court held that a defendant can be convicted of multiple
crimes from one course of conduct, so long as each crime has an element
the other does not have. Judged by this standard, the convictions of Ingram
would have survived the challenge, for each of the two crimes in question
(selling drugs to a minor and trafficking within 1000 yards of a school) had
an element the other did not have. This outcome illustrates the long reach
of Burge and shows the special vulnerability of drug offenders to a "double
counting" of crimes.1
2 4
Even under Ingram, drug offenders were vulnerable to count
manipulation, redundant charges, and punishments with little if any
relationship to the moral blameworthiness of the conduct for which
they were imposed. The following cases were decided by the Kentucky
Supreme Court before Burg.
1. Grenke v. Commonwealth:12 - The defendant sold a quantity of cocaine to
an undercover police officer for $1100 and about fifteen minutes later, in
the same vicinity and at the same meeting, gave the same officer a sample
of crack cocaine. He was indicted for trafficking in cocaine (for the sale)
and for transferring cocaine (for the gift), was convicted of both offenses,
was sentenced to ten years in prison for each offense, and was then ordered
to serve the two terms consecutively. In reacting to his complaint about
redundant charges, the Kentucky Supreme Court said "the appellant
committed two distinct criminal acts, and was for each legitimately subject
to prosecution, conviction, and punishment."
2 6
121 Id. at 324.
122 Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996).
123 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (citing Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)); see also Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass, 433, 434 (1871)
("A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sen-
tence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them
would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other.").
124 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
125 Grenke v. Commonwealth, 796 S.W.2d 858,858 (Ky. 199o).
126 Id. at 859.
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2. Brooks v. Commonwealth: M The defendant was found in possession of a
quantity of methamphetamine in his home along with "a methamphetamine
lab." 118 He was prosecuted for manufacturing the drug and for trafficking in
the drug (possession with intent to sell), was convicted of both crimes, and
was sentenced to thirty years in prison (consecutive terms of twenty years
for the first conviction and ten years for the second). His argument that he
had committed but one crime fell on deaf ears in both the trial and appeals
courts.
3. Kroth v. Commonwealth: "' Being in possession of a large quantity of pills
in his home, the defendant was prosecuted for trafficking in drugs (through
possession with intent to sell). Because the pills were listed on two separate
drug law schedules (Schedules III and IV), he was charged with two counts
of trafficking for his single act of possession, was convicted of both counts,
and got from the convictions two separate sentences to prison (which can
be accumulated at the discretion of the judge). The Kentucky Supreme
Court was not impressed with his argument that he had committed only one
crime, except for dissenting Justice Leibson who expressed serious concern
about the great potential for use and abuse of such decisions as this:
Once again our Court has opted for an unduly harsh
interpretation of the double jeopardy principle. We should
resist, rather than assist, prosecutorial efforts to break up a single
criminal transaction into as many different crimes as possible,
thus imposing a greater punishment than would be otherwise
authorized.
... Simply because this single trafficking offense involved
two different types of pills, the appellant has been found guilty
of two separate violations of KRS 218A.140, which makes it
a crime to "traffic in any controlled substance." It would be
equally sensible to break this single criminal transaction into
3,765 offenses because a total of 3,765 pills were recovered.
30
Perhaps in his last statement Justice Leibson exaggerates the threat
to defendants from redundant charges. But there is in his observation a
pointed reminder that limitations on punishment ought to rest in the law
127 Brooks v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W3d 219, 221, 223 (Ky. 2007).
128 Id. at 221.
129 Kroth v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.zd 68o, 68o-8i (Ky. 1987).
130 Id. at 68z (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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and not in the hands of the prosecution.
Under the authority of these cases and others, a defendant who sells
drugs to the same undercover agent seven times in a day (or seven times in
a week) can be charged with and convicted of seven counts of trafficking, 3'
a defendant found in possession of marijuana plants can be convicted of
both cultivating marijuana and trafficking in marijuana, and a defendant
found with a small quantity of marijuana, a residue of cocaine, a Xanax
pill, and a cocaine pipe can be convicted of four possession crimes for his
single act of possession. In these situations, the defendant is at the mercy
of the trial court as to whether he will serve concurrent or consecutive
terms in prison for his convictions. Punishments pile up in these situations,
proportionality between punishment and moral blameworthiness gets lost
in the shuffle, society gets more punishment than it needs, offenders who
pose very little if any threat to public safety get very long prison terms, and
the state's overcrowded and underfunded correctional facilities get more
pressure.
E. Conclusion
The objective in this part of the Article has been to show that the state's
drug laws are an unqualified "mess" (even more so than the state's broader
penal code). They have earned this label through about thirty-five years of
tough-on-crime advocacy and a pattern of lawmaking that is anything but
extraordinary in the criminal law area:
[Tihe legal rules that define crimes and sentences tend to err on the harsh
side - not because of anyone's ideological stance, but because of the way
the lawmaking process works .... Every generation has its high-profile
crime stories and media frenzies, which leave behind a trail of new criminal
prohibitions. Some of those prohibitions are good ideas; others aren't. All
of them - the bad ideas as well as the good ones - tend to remain in place,
permanently.'32
The "crime stories" in the drug arena have been general rather than
specific ("marijuana is a gateway drug,"'3 3 "crack cocaine is the scourge of
131 See Turner v. Commonwealth, 248 S.W.3 d 543 (Ky. 2oo8) (convicting defendant of
three counts of trafficking in the first degree (for the methadone) and one count of trafficking
in the third degree (for the Xanax), for selling methadone on three separate occasions (within
a few days' time and arranged by a confidential informant) to an undercover police officer and
on one occasion for also selling to the officer four Xanax pills, and sentencing defendant to
three twenty-year terms in prison and one twelve-month term).
132 William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, I17 HA v.
L. REV. 2548, 2558 (2004).
133 See PETER J. COHEN, DRUGS, ADDICTION, AND THE LAW: POLICY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC
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the earth," 134 and "methamphetamine use has reached epidemic levels"
131), but they have had familiar effects - very few good ideas, lots of bad
ones, and drug violation penalties that make a total mockery of our promise
of "just and appropriately preventive punishments."
136
Lawmakers have grown weary of the costs of incarceration (in all areas,
but especially the drug area), are more skeptical of demands for more crime-
fighting weaponry than they have been for a long time, and have now heard
from an unimpeachable source that Kentucky has an unusually high rate
of growth in its inmate population.'37 Whether or not these circumstances
could open the door to meaningful reform of the state's drug laws remains
to be seen, for it is clear that lawmakers have not declared the "war on
drugs" a lost cause, have not shelved any of the sentencing weapons used
against drug offenders, and have not to any extent drawn back from the
tough drug laws described above. But at no point during the last thirty-five
years (the "war" period) have they faced a more pressing need to weigh
the costs and benefits of incarcerating large numbers of people who pose
no real threat to public safety. This reality could perhaps lead to some
examination and scrutiny of the drug laws that has not occurred since 1972,
if ever, and maybe to some renewed appreciation for what used to be basic
moral principles:
Criminal penalties should not cost more than the benefits they achieve or
cause individual or social harms which outweigh their crime-controlling
effects or other benefits. Punishment should also be efficient. Penalties
should not be more severe or more costly than necessary; if the same crime-
control and other benefits can be achieved with less severe or less costly
HEALTH 30-32 (2004) (identifying the appeal of the hypothesis of marijuana as a "gateway
drug"); see also RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION:
A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 213-14 (1974) (noting testi-
mony given at the Boggs Act hearings identifying marijuana as a gateway drug).
134 See Timothy Egan, War on Crack Retreats, Still Taking Prisoners, N.Y. IMES, Feb. 28,
1999, atAi (quoting former Attorney General Edwin Meese III as stating "[c]rack cocaine was
the scourge of the inner city"); see also Roseanne Scotti, Comment, The "Almost Overwhelming
Temptation ": The Hegemony of Drug War Discourse in Recent Federal Court Decisions Involving
Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 139, 146 (2000) (noting the popu-
larity of defining drugs "as a scourge").
135 See Eric Lichtblau, L.A. Region Still Key Gateway for Drugs, Study Says, L.A. TiMES,
Dec. 16, 1999, at BI (quoting Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey as stating "[wle do not just have
a national drug problem. What we really have is a series of local drug epidemics"); see also
Scotti, supra note 134, at 146-47 (noting the use of the word "epidemic" to describe meth-
amphetamine).
136 Michael Tonty, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reforma, 58 STAN. L. REV. 37,
42 (Z005).
137 Lawson, supra note 27, at 3. In the year 2008, "the Pew Center on the States reported
a growth rate for Kentucky's inmate population for year 2007 of I2 percent, the highest in the
nation . I... Id
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methods, those methods should be preferred.138
III THE DRUG LAWS IN ACTION
A. Introduction
Beyond the fact that they have produced a large population of inmates,
little is known about the manner in which the drug laws described above
are applied in the state's courtrooms. It is obvious that the laws deliver to
prosecutors a very wide array of options in the handling of individual cases
and subsequently give enormous influence to the prosecution over who
is to be incarcerated and for how long. Hoping for a clearer picture of the
impact of these laws on the state's justice system, I conducted field studies
of drug prosecutions in the circuit courts of two adjoining counties.
In the first part of the study, I examined all prosecutions that were
conducted in the Fayette Circuit Court during the calendar year 2003
(choosing this year so that cases had time to move through the court system
to a conclusion). In this evaluation, and in the Scott County evaluation
described below, I limited my study to the contents of court files, knowing
that in so doing I would get a partial glimpse and not a complete portrait
of how the state's drug laws are being implemented. 139 At the conclusion
of this effort, I conducted an identical study of criminal prosecutions in
Scott Circuit Court except that in this smaller jurisdiction I examined all
cases processed over a two-year period (calendar years 2002 and 2003) so
that I would have reasonably comparable studies from the two courts. I
hoped at the end of the joint study to have a better understanding of how
the drug laws and prosecutorial practices under those laws have produced
about 5000 inmates for the state's overcrowded corrections system.' 4
B. The Fayette Study
1. Introduction.- Grand juries returned approximately 1600 indictments in
Fayette County in 2003 (all producing case files reviewed for this study).
About 1,400 cases moved through the court system to a final disposition
138 Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 72-73 (2005) (footnotes
omitted); see also Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571,593-96 (2005) (discussing
ends and means proportionality).
139 The court files contained enough information to reveal the nature of the criminal
conduct under scrutiny, the charges filed against defendants, some of the criminal history of
defendants, and the outcome of the prosecutions. Most cases ended in negotiated settlements
and guilty pleas, with the court files showing little about this part of the process. See Robert G.
Lawson, Summary of 2003 Kentucky Fayette Circuit Court Case Files (unpublished notes, on
file with author) [hereinafter Lawson, Fayette Summary].
140 See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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and thus provided helpful information for the study (while the rest were
either sent to lower courts or ended without final disposition for one reason
or another). Almost twenty-five percent of the total caseload involved the
prosecution of drug charges (344 out of 1400),41 a statistic that may explain
why a substantial part of the state's inmate explosion has been credited to
the "war on drugs."
2. Offenders.- In almost two-thirds of the cases examined for the study,
defendants were charged with drug trafficking (212 out of 344), and in
slightly more than half of these cases, defendants were convicted of
trafficking (110 out of 212),142 statistics that might seem to suggest a high
level involvement of the offender group in the illegal drug business. Upon
a closer examination, however, the group looks more like drug abusers
and bit players in the drug business than big-time profiteers who stand
outside the drug epidemic and exploit for personal gain the misfortune of
the abusers.
Less than one-third of the trafficking cases involved a sale or transfer
of drugs by defendants, and even in these cases most of the defendants
had a history of illegal drug activities and looked more like "mules"
than "kingpins."'' 4 3 Most of the rest of the trafficking cases were based
on accusations that defendants possessed drugs with intent to sell, made
easy by the fact that the drug laws say nothing about the quantity of drugs
that must be possessed in order to support such a charge and conviction
(except for the laws on marijuana).' In a few of the possession-with-
intent cases, the defendants looked like marginally high-level offenders
(not kingpins),' but in most cases they looked like users and abusers, as in
141 Only cases in which drug charges predominated over other charges were included in
this calculation; not included were nineteen additional cases in which drug charges appeared
to play a minor role in the prosecutions. See Lawson, Fayette Summary, supra note 139.
142 See Robert G. Lawson, Notes on 2003 Kentucky Fayette Circuit Court Case Files
(unpublished notes, on file with author) [hereinafter Lawson, Fayette Notes].
143 See Eric L. Sevigny & Jonathan P. Caulkins, Kingpins or Mules: An Analysis of Drug
Offenders Incarcerated in Federal and State Prisons, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 401, 410 (2004)
("Combining data for federal and state inmates, retail sellers (37%) and peripheral role offend-
ers (35%) were particularly likely to have committed their offense for money to buy drugs or
to obtain drugs for their personal use.").
144 Compare Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A.1412-.1414 (LexisNexis 2007), with id. §
21 8A. 1421(5).
145 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vinegar, No. 03-CR-oo777 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Oct. 6,
2003) (where defendant was convicted of trafficking for selling $2000 worth of crack cocaine
to a police informant); Commonwealth v. Sosa, No. 03-CR--o097 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Oct.
7, 2003) (where defendant was found in possession of 425 grams of cocaine and baggies);
Commonwealth v. Rydell, No. 03-CR-oI541 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb. 1i, 2004) (where
defendant possessed in his residence twenty-four grams of cocaine, thirty-nine grams of
marijuana, and baggies); Commonwealth v. Flores-Escalante, No. 03-CR-0024I (Ky. Fayette
Cir. Ct. Apr. 14, 2003) (where defendant was found in possession of more than five pounds of
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the following set of illustrative cases:
1. Robert Welch: 146 He was arrested while in possession of cocaine, marijuana,
and amphetamine pills and was prosecuted for trafficking, marijuana
possession, amphetamine possession, and drug paraphernalia possession.
He pleaded guilty to four offenses and was sent to prison for seven years.
2. CecilRussell:14' He was approached by police and found to be in possession
of crack cocaine, was prosecuted for trafficking in cocaine, was convicted
upon a guilty plea, and was sent to prison for five years.
3. Dean Marin:14 s He was stopped in his car under suspicion of drunk driving
and was found to be in possession of a small amount of crack cocaine. He
was charged with first degree trafficking, driving under the influence, and
second degree persistent felony offender. He entered guilty pleas to drug
possession, DUI, and second degree PFO, and was sent to prison for seven
years.
A very high percentage of all drug offenders in the study looked like this
illustrative group and a very high percentage ended up in prison or jail (as
described below), some for lengthy periods of incarceration.
3. Enhancements.- It is fair to say that the state's drug laws are saturated
with penalty enhancements, and it is easy to see from the study that they
deliver extraordinary power over punishments to the prosecution. The
prosecution pursued penalty enhancement in 144 cases (out of the 344
total), 149 not counting enhancements from the special offense of trafficking
within 1000 yards of a school (which is separately discussed below). It used
the persistent felony offender law in ninety-eight cases, the "two-strikes"
provisions of the drug laws in forty-two cases, and gun enhancement in
twenty-four cases (with about sixteen of these cases involving a use of
more than one of the enhancement provisions of the law). 5'
The persistent felony offender law is a very powerful sentencing weapon
that was used heavily and effectively in the drug prosecutions of this study.
marijuana).
146 Commonwealth v. Welch, No. 03--CR-oo334 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004).
147 Commonwealth v. Russell, No. 0 3-CR-oo590 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb. 25, 2004).
Mr. Russell's sentence was initially suspended and he was placed on probation for five
years. Mr. Russell violated the terms of his probation by absconding from the Drug Court
Program, his probation was revoked, and he was sent to prison to serve the five-year sentence.
Commonwealth v. Russell, No. 03-CR-oo59--oo1 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 2005).
148 Commonwealth v. Martin, No. o3 -CR-oo7o2 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2003).




The following cases illustrate its operation and effect on punishments:
1. George Henderson:'-" He had cocaine in his possession, ran from the police,
and attempted to conceal the cocaine. He was charged with trafficking,
tampering with evidence, and first degree PFO (with prior convictions for
wanton endangerment and trafficking). He was convicted of drug possession
and first degree PFO, got four years and an enhancement to ten under the
PFO law, and was sent to prison for ten years.
2. Robert Dawson:' He was arrested for drunkenness and upon booking was
found in possession of one gram of cocaine. He was charged with possession
and first degree PFO (prior convictions for possession, bail jumping, and
handgun possession by a convicted felon), was convicted of both, got five
years for drug possession and an enhancement to twenty under the PFO
law, and was sent to prison for twenty years.
3. Raymond Alden Harris:153 After arrest for possession of less than a gram of
cocaine and a baggy of marijuana, he was charged with cocaine possession,
marijuana possession, and second degree PFO (prior conviction for
trafficking in marijuana). He pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and
second degree PFO, got one year in prison for cocaine possession and an
enhancement to five years under the PFO law, and was sent to prison for
five years.
4. Ray Welch: s4 He was stopped for driving under the influence and was
found in possession of marijuana and a marijuana pipe. He was charged
with trafficking within 1000 yards of a school, drug paraphernalia possession,
and first degree PFO (prior felony convictions for DUI). He pleaded guilty
to marijuana trafficking, possession of paraphernalia, and first degree PFO,
got one year for the drug crimes, had this term enhanced to ten years for the
PFO conviction, and was sent to prison for ten years.
5. Jose Crooks:'-' He was arrested for public intoxication, was found to be in
possession of cocaine and marijuana, was prosecuted for cocaine trafficking,
marijuana possession, and first degree PFO (prior trafficking convictions),
was convicted of all charges, was sentenced to seven years for the drug
crimes, got an enhanced sentence of fifteen years under the PFO law, and
was sent to prison for fifteen years.
151 Commonwealth v. Henderson, No. 03-CR-o0942 (Ky. Fayette Cit. Ct. Apr. 27,
2004).
152 Commonwealth v. Dawson, No. o3-CR-o1358 (Ky. Fayette Cit. Ct. June 22, 2004).
153 Commonwealth v. Harris, No. o3-CR-oI 4 69 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2004).
154 Commonwealth v. Welch, No. o3-CR-oo52o (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Nov. 19, 2003).
155 Commonwealth v. Crooks, No. o3-CR-o323 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. 3, 2004).
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6. Wuan Carlos Jones:5 6 Police went to the scene of a disturbance and
upon arrival found a bag of crack cocaine lying on the ground near where
the defendant stood. He was charged with trafficking, possession of
paraphernalia, and first degree PFO (because of two prior drug convictions).
He pleaded to possession of cocaine, possession of paraphernalia, and first
degree PFO, got five years for the drug crimes and an enhancement to ten
years for the PFO charge, and was sent to prison for ten years.
7. Adrian Richardson:..7 He ran from the police while in possession of a plastic
bag containing a small amount of cocaine. He was charged with trafficking,
resisting arrest, fleeing from police, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
first degree PFO (based on prior convictions for drug possession). He
pleaded guilty to cocaine possession and second degree PFO, got five years
for the drug offense and an enhancement to ten under the PFO law, flunked
out of drug court, and was sent to prison for ten years.
8. Shannon Oxner.18 He was arrested for a violation of parole, was found
in possession of one gram of cocaine, was charged with cocaine possession
and first degree PFO, pleaded guilty to both charges, got one year for the
possession crime and an enhancement to ten under the PFO law. For
possession of the gram of cocaine he was sent to prison for ten years.
The PFO law is meant to produce disproportionate punishment and
certainly accomplishes that objective in drug cases, delivering in routine
fashion penalties that are five to ten times higher than normal. And it makes
such enhancements possible in a very high percentage of cases in which it
is employed, shown by the fact that PFO convictions (and accompanying
enhancement) occurred in about three-fourths of the cases (seventy-two
out of ninety-eight) 5 9 in which a PFO enhancement was sought. In most
cases, it is fair to conclude that there is no defense to PFO charges once
a defendant is found guilty of his or her most recent offense for which
enhanced punishment is sought.
In many of the PFO cases in the study, the prosecution used prior drug
convictions in pursuit of its enhancement objective, meaning that in these
situations it might have pursued penalty enhancement under one of the
many repeat offender provisions of the drug laws (rather than the PFO laws
of the state's general penal code). 160 In some instances, it may have used
156 Commonwealth v. Jones, No. o3-CR--o1374 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Jan. 13, 2004).
157 Commonwealth v. Richardson, No. o3-CR-oI400 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Apr. 18,
2oo6).
158 Commonwealth v. Oxner, No. o3-CR-oI44i (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb. 10, 2004).
159 Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
16o The PFO law has a longer reach than the repeat offender provisions of the drug laws,
[Vol. 98
DRUG LAW REFORM
the PFO law in order to get around an important limitation on the "two-
strikes" enhancement under the drug laws16' and in others it may have
used the PFO law to obtain still greater enhancement of penalties. 61 In a
few cases in the study, the two repeat offender laws were used together (in
conjunction with each other) to achieve still greater punishment (through
so-called double enhancement), as illustrated by the following cases:
1. EdwardL. West '6 He was stopped for driving on a suspended license
with cocaine on his person. He had an earlier drug conviction that was
used to enhance this charge from a Class D to a Class C felony and had
a prior flagrant nonsupport conviction that was used for a second degree
PFO prosecution. Upon guilty pleas, he was sentenced to five years for
possession, had this enhanced to ten years under the PFO law, and was sent
to prison for ten years.
2. Paul TaylorM6 He was prosecuted for trafficking in a simulated
controlled substance which is normally punished as a misdemeanor offense
(maximum of twelve months in jail).' 1 He had one prior drug conviction
that enhanced this crime to the felony level (which served to qualify him
for PFO prosecution), had a second drug conviction that was used for a
second degree PFO charge and conviction, got a one year sentence for the
trafficking offense enhanced to five years by the PFO conviction, and was
sent to prison for five years.
3. Kevin Mayes:166 He was apprehended and found to be in possession
of small amounts of crack cocaine and marijuana. He was charged with
allowing for enhancement on the basis of a prior conviction for any felony offense. See Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.O80 (LexisNexis zoo8). Meanwhile, the repeat offender provisions of the
drug laws allow for enhancement on the basis of prior convictions for drug crimes only. See Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.o10(35) (LexisNexis 2007). In a different respect, the repeat offender
provisions of the drug laws have a longer reach, for they sometimes allow for enhancement
of misdemeanor crimes on the basis of prior misdemeanor convictions, which is not possible
under the PFO law. See id. §218A. 1417.
161 In defining "second or subsequent offense" for enhancement purposes, the drug
laws prohibit the use of a possession conviction to enhance the penalty for a trafficking of-
fense, obviously because of already-enhanced punishment for the latter. See § 218A.o1o(35).
162 The PFO law and the drug laws provide the same kind of penalty enhancement for
so-called "two-strike" offenders (those with only one prior conviction). But for drug offenders
with more than one prior conviction ("three-strike" offenders), the PFO law authorizes more
enhancement in some instances than do the drug laws (partly through a prohibition against
parole for ten years for some PFO offenders). See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(6) (LexisNexis
2oo8).
163 Commonwealth v. West, No. o3-CR-oo582 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. July 17, 2003).
164 Commonwealth v. Taylor, No. 03-CR-oo787 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2003).
165 See KY. REV. STAr. ANN. § 2 18A.35o(7) (LexisNexis 2007).
166 Commonwealth v. Mayes, No. o3-CR-oi5o1 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Mar. 2, 2004).
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cocaine possession (enhanced from a Class D to a Class C felony by a prior
drug conviction), marijuana possession, and second degree PFO (because of
a prior burglary conviction). He pleaded guilty to all three charges, had a one
year sentence for cocaine possession enhanced to ten years by the second
degree PFO conviction, and was sent to prison for ten years.
In a greater number of cases, the repeat offender provisions of the drug laws
were used on their own to elevate punishments to higher levels, either by enhancing
the classification of felony crimes (from Class D to Class C, for example) or by
converting misdemeanor crimes (and penalties of no more than twelve months in
jail) into felonies (with penalties of one to five years in prison), such as these:
1. Otis Ragland 111.167 He obtained prescription drugs by fraud on three
occasions, was prosecuted for obtaining drugs by fraud (three counts), and
pleaded guilty to one count of fraud. He had a prior drug conviction that
enhanced the crime to which he pleaded guilty from a Class D to a Class C
felony. He was sentenced to ten years in prison, flunked out of drug court,
and was sent to prison for ten years.
2. Jeff Powell:16s The defendant was apprehended while in possession of
a cocaine pipe and was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia (a
misdemeanor). He pleaded guilty to this offense and was sentenced as a
repeat drug offender to one year in prison. He flunked out of drug court,
and was sent to prison for a year.
169
In the cases described in this and the preceding paragraph, the defendants
suffered explicit punishment enhancement as repeat offenders either under
the PFO law or the "two-strikes" provisions of the drug laws. In many other
cases in which charges were made under these laws, defendants entered
guilty pleas without repeat offender findings and accepted punishments
that were oftentimes affected to some extent by the dismissed repeat
offender charges (adding to the total effect of these laws on punishment
of drug offenders).
As stated above, the study included twenty-four cases in which gun
possession by the drug offender was used in pursuit of greater punishment.
The law provides for enhancement when a gun is possessed "at the time of
the commission of the offense and in furtherance of the offense,""17 and if
applicable, the law qualifies defendants for punishments at one level above
167 Commonwealth v. Ragland, No. o3-CR-oio88 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Nov. 7, 2003).
68 Commonwealth v. Powell, No. o3-CR--oo38o (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. June 4, 2003).
169 See also Commonwealth v. Fauth, No. 03-CR--ooo6 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Oct. 9,
2003) (same conduct, circumstances, and sentence); Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 03-CR-
01297 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2003) (same conduct, circumstances, and sentence).
17o Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.992 (LexisNexis 2007).
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normal.17' Most if not all of the gun enhancement cases of the study looked
very much like the illustrative cases that are set out below:
1. Anita Renfro:7 2 She had marijuana (more than eight ounces), Xanax pills,
and a gun in her residence. She was charged with marijuana trafficking
(elevated from D to C felony because of the gun) and Xanax trafficking
(elevated from misdemeanor to felony because of the gun), entered guilty
pleas to both charges, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of one and
five years in prison. After a period of failed probation, she was sent to prison
for six years.
2. Anthony Jackson:'73 He possessed a gun and 9.4 grams of crack cocaine in
his pickup truck. He was charged with cocaine trafficking (elevated by the
gun), pleaded guilty to cocaine possession (elevated by the gun), and was
sent to prison for five years.
3. Antwan Bates:r '74 He possessed in his pockets a small bag of cocaine and a
gun. He was prosecuted for cocaine possession (with a gun) and for PFO
in the second degree (prior assault conviction). He pleaded guilty to both
charges, received five years for possession and an enhancement to ten years
for the second degree PFO, and was sent to prison for ten years.
4. Martin Rojas:'71 The defendant was arrested in a residence located near a
day care center. He had in his possession a small quantity of marijuana and
a gun, which was found in a trash can. He was charged with trafficking near
a school (with a gun), trafficking in marijuana (with a gun), and possession of
drug paraphernalia. He entered guilty pleas to trafficking near a school and
trafficking in marijuana (with a gun), was given a one-year term for the first
and a five-year term for the second, and was sent to prison for five years.
There was a form of "double counting" in the gun enhancement cases of
the study, i.e., the use of one gun to elevate more than one crime, both in
formulating charges, as in Rojas, and in rendering convictions, as in Renfro.1
76
171 For example, a Class D felony (one to five years) is elevated by gun possession to a
Class C felony (five to ten years), and misdemeanors (maximum of twelve months in jail) are
elevated to Class D felonies (one to five years). See id. § 218A.992(l).
172 Commonwealth. v. Renfro, No. o3-CR--oo604 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 2003).
173 Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. o3-CR-oo725-0o1 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Dec. 18,
2003).
174 Commonwealth v. Bates, No. o3-CR--oo995 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2004).
175 Commonwealth v. Rojas, No. 03-CR--oo394-oo2 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. June z6,
2003).
176 Although the statute does not authorize such practices, a decision of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals does. Adams v. Commonwealth, 931 S.W2d 465, 468 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
The Kentucky Supreme Court has yet to render a decision on the subject. Set Rojas, No.
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Additionally, there was some double enhancement of punishment in the
cases, i.e., from use of the gun enhancement provision in combination with
one of the repeat offender laws, as in Bates.' More importantly, in every
single gun enhancement case of the study, there was a total absence of proof
that the gun was involved in any fashion in the commission of the drug
crime. In every case, gun possession appeared to be a mere coincidence of
the defendant's drug offense and was treated more like an "excuse" than a
"reason" for harsher punishment of drug offenders.'78
4. Trafficking Near a SchooL- This special drug offense is in the nature
of a punishment enhancement, i.e., it provides the basis for an extra
conviction from a single event ("double counting"). It also works to elevate
misdemeanor offenses (like trafficking in marijuana or other low-level
drugs) to felonies.'79 As discussed above, the offense has a reach that
extends far beyond its most legitimate rationale (protecting children from
illegal drug activities) and may lead to highly questionable, if not abusive,
prosecutions. It gives the police and prosecution a very usable weapon
(because it extends to virtually all illegal drug activities that occur within
1000 yards, or ten city blocks, of a school), and in almost any aggressive fight
against illegal drugs, it is likely to get heavy use, as it did in Fayette County
in 2003. Over 12% of all drug prosecutions during this period (forty-two
out of 344 cases) involved the offense of drug trafficking within 1000 yards
of a school, 180 enough to suggest that illegal drug dealers had local schools
under siege.
Looking beyond the numbers in this set of cases, one finds an
absolutely remarkable similarity in the drug activities used in support of the
prosecutions, with not even a hint of danger to schools or schoolchildren.
03-CR-oo394-002; Renfro, No. o3-CR-oo6o4.
177 The statute does not authorize nor prohibit such practices, and neither of the state's
appeals courts has spoken on the issue (although the state's case law has generally been recep-
tive to double enhancements). Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.9 9 z (LexisNexis 2007). See Bates,
No. o3-CR-oo995.
178 In 2003 (the year of the study), the gun enhancement statute required only that a
gun be possessed during commission of the drug offense. The Kentucky Supreme Court
had by this time said that there had to be a "nexus" between possession of the gun and com-
mission of the drug offense in order for enhancement to be appropriate, Commonwealth v.
Montaque, 23 S.W.3d 629,632 (Ky. 2ooo), but had also said that there could be enhancement
("nexus") if the gun and illegal drugs were found in the immediate control of a defendant.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 436-37 (Ky. 2003). In 2005 (subsequent to the
study), the General Assembly amended the statute to require that a defendant must possess
the gun "in furtherance of the offense." Act of Mar. 18, 2005, ch. 150, § 12, 2005 Ky. Acts 1354,
1362. Whether or not this addition will make it harder to use the statute for penalty enhance-
ment remains to be seen, for it is not clear that the new language adds much to the "nexus"
requirement imposed by the case law described in this footnote.
179 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
i8o Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
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The following cases are illustrative of the whole group:
1. Chazaray Mefford: 8 1 He was stopped in a vehicle near the location of a
school, possessed a small amount of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, was
charged with trafficking near a school, possession of paraphernalia, and an
unlawful transaction with a minor. He pleaded guilty to all charges, got
one year for the trafficking offense, twelve months (concurrent) for the
paraphernalia, and one year (consecutive) for the unlawful transaction with
a minor. He was sent to prison for two years.
2. John Hayden:18 2 He was stopped for reckless driving and was found to be
in possession of marijuana and a gun. He was charged with trafficking near
a school, carrying a concealed weapon, and reckless driving, pleaded guilty
to all charges, and after revocation of probation was sent to prison for one
year and thirty days.
3. David Caudill:" He possessed marijuana (fifty-five cigarettes) in his home
(which happened by chance to be located within 1000 yards of a school). He
was charged with trafficking near a school, pleaded guilty to the charge, and
after revocation of probation was sent to prison for one year.
4. Maurice Williams: ' He was arrested for public intoxication upon leaving
a bar located within 1000 yards of a school, had marijuana on his person,
was charged with trafficking near a school and public intoxication, pleaded
guilty as charged, and was sent to prison for one year.
5. Michael Bishop:185 He had a single marijuana plant growing inside his
residence which was located near a school. He was prosecuted for trafficking
near a school, cultivating less than five marijuana plants, and possession of
paraphernalia. He pleaded guilty to all charges, got one year in prison for the
first offense and twelve months for each of the other two, and after a period
of probation was sent to prison for a year.
In only two of the forty-two cases was the "trafficking" charge based upon
an actual sale of drugs. In all the others, the charge was grounded in the
possession of drugs "with intent to sell" (and in many instances with
intent to sell what was a very small quantity of drugs). None of the forty-
two cases involved a sale of drugs to schoolchildren or a sale on school
181 Commonwealth v. Mefford, No. o3-CR-oo549 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2003).
182 Commonwealth v. Hayden, No. o3-CR--oo58o-ooz (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. June 3,
2004).
183 Commonwealth v. Caudill, No. 03-CR-oo589 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Jan. 22, 2004).
184 Commonwealth v. Williams, No. o3-CR-oo915 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Sept. I6, 2003).
185 Commonwealth v. Bishop, No. 03-CR-oI454 (Ky. Fayette Cit. Ct. Dec. 5, 2005).
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grounds. Furthermore, in none of the forty-two cases was there possession
of drugs on school grounds or in the general vicinity of schoolchildren.",
In an extraordinarily high percentage of the cases involving this charge, the
conduct of the defendants was identical to the conduct of the defendants
in the illustrative cases: namely, illegal drug possession in a vehicle that
happened by chance to be stopped by police within 1000 yards of a school
or illegal drug possession in a residence that happened to be located within
1000 yards of a school. In virtually every case, the fact that the conduct
occurred within 1000 yards of a school was nothing more than a coincidence
of the defendant's offense and, once again, much more of an "excuse" than
a "reason" for the harsher punishment of defendants.
5. Double Counting.- This label is used by scholars to describe the practice
of separating a defendant's conduct into segments in order to prosecute for
multiple crimes.'87 Double counting has undoubtedly played a role in the
growth of inmate populations, is especially prominent in drug prosecutions,
and is easily the most common characteristic of the 344 cases of the Fayette
study (with very few cases involving single-offense prosecutions). It is
liberally allowed by the law (especially in drug prosecutions) and is used
at the unbridled discretion of the prosecution. In the cases comprising
this study, it was clearly used aggressively. The following cases provide
examples:
1. Bernadine Jackson:'" She possessed crack cocaine, marijuana, and drug
paraphernalia when she was arrested. She was charged with trafficking in
cocaine, marijuana possession, and paraphernalia possession. She pleaded
guilty to cocaine possession and paraphernalia possession, and was sent to
prison for three years (and twelve months concurrent).
2. Raymond Kidd:-' He was observed by police sitting in his parked car
without lights on and threw cocaine and a pipe under the car as the officer
approached. He was prosecuted for possession of cocaine and possession
of paraphernalia (second offense), pleaded guilty to both charges, got
consecutive terms of one year for each offense, and was sent to prison for
two years.
3. Bran Crutchfield:' g He was sleeping in a vehicle containing 2.5 grams
of cocaine and a bag of marijuana, was prosecuted for cocaine trafficking,
186 See Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
187 See Cone, supra note i i9; see also Ross, supra note i 19.
i88 Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. o3-CR-oo527 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. June 24, 2003).
189 Commonwealth v. Kidd, No. o3-CR-o1366 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb 1o, 2004).




marijuana possession, and drug paraphernalia possession. He pleaded guilty
to cocaine possession and marijuana possession, was sentenced to four years
(plus nintey days), received probation that was later revoked, and was sent
to prison for four years.
4. Nathan Abner.9' The defendant was found to be cultivating marijuana
and at the same time possessing a firearm. On the basis of this event, he
was charged with trafficking in marijuana, cultivating marijuana (less than
five plants), and possession of marijuana, with his gun possession used to
enhance two of the three counts. He entered guilty pleas to all charges and
was sent to prison for ten years.
In the Abner case, the prosecution took advantage of both double
counting and penalty enhancement, which is permitted by the law and
was found to have been used in many of the cases in the study (including
some double enhancements). The following cases demonstrate this
proposition:
1. Darrell Damons: 192 He was stopped for drunk driving, was found to be
in possession of a small amount of cocaine and marijuana (and drug
paraphernalia), and was charged with cocaine possession, paraphernalia
possession, trafficking in marijuana, and drunk driving. He had a prior
possession conviction that was used to elevate the cocaine possession and
paraphernalia possession charges and to support a second degree PFO charge.
He pleaded guilty to four charges (possession of cocaine, paraphernalia, and
marijuana, and drunk driving) and to the second degree PFO charge, was
sentenced to five years for the four offenses, and was sent to prison for ten
years under the PFO charge.
2.James Wheeler 111.: 3 He was stopped for having loud music in his vehicle,
resisted the officer, tried to conceal cocaine that he possessed at the time,
and was found upon arrest to possess marijuana (three grams) and rolling
papers. He was charged with cocaine trafficking, tampering with evidence,
marijuana trafficking (less than eight ounces), possession of paraphernalia,
and first degree PFO (because of prior drug convictions). He pleaded guilty
to drug possession, marijuana trafficking, paraphernalia possession, and
second degree PFO, got five years (plus twelve months twice) for the drug
offenses, and under the PFO law was sentenced to ten years. The sentence
was suspended and he was placed on probation for five years.
191 Commonwealth v. Abner, No. o3--CR-oo 3o6 (Ky. Fayette Cit. Ct. July 22, 2003).
192 Commonwealth v. Damons, No. o3-CR-oloo9 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Mar. 17, 2004).
193 Commonwealth v. Wheeler, No. o3-CR-oI 142 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. Feb. 3, 2004).
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3. Dudley Bell III:'94 He was apprehended while in possession of cocaine,
methadone, hydrocodone, marijuana, and two guns; he was charged with
gun possession as a convicted felon (for a prior drug conviction), possession
of cocaine (with a gun), possession of methadone (with a gun), possession
of hydrocodone (with a gun), possession of marijuana (with a gun), and with
second degree PFO for a prior flagrant nonsupport conviction. He pleaded
guilty to gun possession (as a felon), possession of drugs (one count), and
second degree PFO, was given five years for the possession convictions, had
this enhanced to ten years by the PFO law, and was sent to prison for ten
years.
The overall effect of double counting on penalties for drug offenders is
incalculable, for there is no regularity in the use of consecutive sentences
and no reliable way to measure the full impact of multiple convictions on
ultimate sentences. Double counting is clearly a source of pressure on
defendants in the plea bargaining process (which fixes punishments in
most cases). It is also a significant piece of the almost unlimited power
over punishment that now rests with the prosecution and on its own can
generate much greater punishment than individual defendants deserve.
If used in conjunction with one of the law's enhancement provisions, it
produces punishments that is grossly disproportionate to the conduct for
which it is imposed (as in the three cases described above). If there is ever
to be meaningful reform of the state's drug laws, the practice of double
counting will have to be addressed as a priority item.
6. Drug Paraphernalia Possession.- Nearly 30% of the cases in the study
(101 out of 344) involved, or included, charges of possession of drug
paraphernalia. ' s A very high percentage of the cases involved double
counting (with possession of drug paraphernalia almost always attached
to drug possession and trafficking charges). About one-third of the cases
involved penalty enhancements (thirty-one for prior drug convictions
and three for possession of a gun), and about two-thirds produced drug
paraphernalia convictions (sixty-six out of 101). '96 In a few cases, the
prosecutions looked like legitimate efforts to punish preparatory conduct
(something akin to an attempt to commit a drug offense in the future), but
in most of the cases, the prosecutions looked like superfluous charges that
would add pressure to defendants in the plea bargaining process and, in
this way and others, add a few more ounces of punishment to punishments
that are already excessive for most drug offenders. Looking at this study,
one could easily conclude that the state's drug crime fighters could live
without a drug paraphernalia possession crime or at least could live with
194 Commonwealth v. Bell, No. o3-CR-o1312 (Ky. Fayette Cir. Ct. May 1, 2004).




one that looked more like an attempt crime than does the existing one.
7. Conclusion.- More than 95% of the drug prosecutions in the study ended
with convictions of the defendants for one or more drug offenses (328 out
of 344),197 almost always by virtue of guilty pleas to lesser (or fewer) crimes
than charged. About one-third of those convicted (107 out of 328) were
sentenced to probation, shock probation, or conditional discharge, and a
few others (nineteen out of 328) were sentenced to relatively short terms in
local jails. Thirty-nine convicted defendants were sentenced to drug court
and twenty-nine were subsequently removed from drug court and sent
to prison, leaving no doubt that drug court (although a good sentencing
alternative) is not a "magic bullet" in the battle against drug abuse. Most
importantly, over 60% of the convicted defendants (202 out of 328) were
sentenced to prison or jail for significant terms of incarceration (at least one
year and usually more). 98 In other words, "the drug laws in action" sent
to the state's overcrowded, underfunded jails and prisons 202 inmates in a
single year from a single county (out of 120).
C. The Scott Study
1. Introduction.- In this study, all criminal prosecutions for two years (2002
and 2003) were examined as they were examined in the prior study (with
court files being reviewed from indictment to final disposition). The total
number of cases reviewed was 175 for year 2002, 169 for year 2003, and 344
for the whole period (or about 25% of the total number of cases reviewed
for the Fayette study). The number of cases involving drug charges (solely
or predominantly) was sixty-five (or about 19% of the total). This was a
high percentage of all prosecutions but less than the percentage of drug
prosecutions in the Fayette study, in which almost 25% of the cases, 344 out
of 1400, involved exclusive or predominant reliance on the drug laws.19
2. Offender.- In thirty-nine of sixty-five cases, defendants were prosecuted
for trafficking in drugs (just slightly below the frequency of these charges
in the Fayette study, 60% in Scott versus 62% in Fayette); in only eight of
these cases did the prosecution rely on drug possession with intent to sell
to support its allegations (rather than an actual sale of drugs), well below
the findings drawn from the Fayette study (20% in Scott versus 66% in
197 Id. The conviction rate would have been even higher but for the fact that some cases
ended with successful motions to suppress evidence (and in one instance after request for the
identity of a confidential informant).
198 Id.
199 See Robert G. Lawson, Notes on 2002-o3 Kentucky Scott Circuit Court Case Files
(unpublished notes, on file with author) [hereinafter Lawson, Scott Notes]; see also Lawson,
Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
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Fayette). Unsurprisingly, given this difference, there flowed from the Scott
prosecutions a substantially higher trafficking conviction rate than flowed
from trafficking prosecutions of Fayette (80% in Scott and about 50% in
Fayette).2 00
Nonetheless, the drug offenders of Scott looked much like those of
Fayette: users and abusers rather than profit-takers. In a small number of
cases, defendants looked like relatively active players in the business (but
not kingpins by any stretch of the imagination), such as these:
1. John Amos:20 1 He had packaged cocaine, packaged marijuana, baggies, and
scales in his vehicle. He was prosecuted for trafficking in cocaine, trafficking
in marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and second degree PFO. He
pleaded guilty to cocaine possession, marijuana trafficking, and possession
of paraphernalia, and was sent to prison for five years.
2. Osvaldo Torres-Cabellera:202 He possessed on his premises 1.4 pounds of
cocaine, scales, plastic baggies, and $13,000 in cash. He was prosecuted
for possession of cocaine, marijuana, and paraphernalia, pleaded guilty to
possession of cocaine, was sentenced to two years in prison, but was sent to
immigration agents for deportation.
A removal of defendants such as these from the community might slow the
sale and use of illegal drugs (at least momentarily), while a removal of most
of the others would only supply inmates for incarceration and leave the
illegal drug business fully intact. The more typical case from Scott looked
like this:
1. Charles Dinger.0 3 He was stopped by police for traffic violations and was
found to be in possession of a marijuana pipe with marijuana residue. He
was charged with possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia
(enhanced by a prior drug conviction), pleaded guilty to both, got sentences
of twelve months and one year, and was credited with time served of one
year.
20o See Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142; Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note 199.
Where trafficking charges are based on possession with intent to sell (as was common in
Fayette County) rather than actual sales (as was the case in Scott County), there is sure to be
bargaining for the reduction of charges to drug possession (especially in cases involving small
amounts of drugs) and a higher level of agreement for such reductions in return for pleas of
guilty. Thus, as one would expect, many of the trafficking prosecutions of Fayette that did not
produce trafficking convictions produced convictions by agreement for drug possession.
201 Commonwealth v. Amos, No. o2-CR-ooo67 (Ky. Scott Cir. Ct. June 2, 2003).
202 Commonwealth v. Torres-Cabellera, No. o2-CR--ooo9o (Ky. Scott Cir. Ct. Jan. 6,
2003).
203 Commonwealth v. Dingier, No. oz-CR-ooo71 (Ky. Scott Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2003).
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As discussed below, defendants of this type (users, abusers, and bit players)
were far less likely to become inmates if sentenced from Scott than if
sentenced from Fayette (36% in Scott and 62% in Fayette).2 04
3. Enhancements.- As described in Part III above, the state's drug laws
(in conjunction with its general repeat offender law) contain punishment
enhancement provisions that deliver to the prosecution enormous leverage
over defendants and punishments, the use of which rests almost totally
within the discretion of individual prosecutors. The prosecution chooses
whether to include enhancements in the charges and, free of restrictions
under the law, decides whether to pursue those charges in the bargaining
process, conditions that can easily distort the fairness and equality of
punishments.
As stated and detailed above, the prosecution engaged in a very
aggressive use of these provisions in Fayette County, formulating charges
to obtain the advantage of punishment enhancement in 142 cases (42% of
all the drug prosecutions in the study) and in a few cases even formulated
the charges so as to take advantage of double enhancements. 05 The
prosecution in Scott County seemed at first glance to be just slightly less
aggressive in its formulation of charges against drug offenders, seeking
punishment enhancement in twenty-one cases (32% of the sixty-five drug
prosecutions found in the study) and double enhancements in none of the
cases.2 06 But beyond the raw numbers there emerges a very different picture
of punishment enhancement in the two counties, both in the formulation
of charges and in the production of convictions.
The most telling differential comes from the uses made of the most
lethal of all enhancement provisions, the persistent felony offender laws
of the general penal code. In Fayette County, the prosecution pursued
this form of enhancement in ninety-eight cases (or 28% of the 344 total)
and obtained PFO convictions and the enhancements that go with them in
seventy-two of those cases (73%); in many of these cases, the enhancement
worked to send defendants to prison for ten years (from five to ten times
the normal sentence), 07 In Scott County, the prosecution filed PFO charges
in eight of its cases (or 12% of the sixty-five total) and most importantly
obtained PFO convictions and the enhancements that go with them in
none of the cases (seventy-two in Fayette; zero in Scott).0 8 An equally
telling differential between the two counties appears in the findings on
gun possession enhancements. The prosecution in Fayette County sought
enhancement under the gun enhancement law in twenty-four cases and
2o4 See Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142; Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note 199.
205 See discussion supra Part IV(B); see also cases cited supra notes 163--66.
zo6 See Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note 199.
207 Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
2o8 Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note 199.
2009-20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
obtained it in eighteen, while the prosecution in Scott County alleged gun
possession for punishment enhancement in only one case and obtained
such enhancement in zero cases.2 0°
Regarding the use of a third type of punishment enhancement (the
"two-strikes" provisions of the state's drug laws), the findings of the two
studies are more similar than different but do show a slightly greater
reliance on punishment enhancement in Fayette County than in Scott. In
both counties, the "two-strikes" laws were used overwhelmingly to elevate
misdemeanor charges to felony charges (in twelve out of twelve cases in
Scott County and in thirty-four out of forty-two cases in Fayette); 10 in
virtually all of the cases in both counties, the enhancements under these
laws were sought for the crime of drug paraphernalia possession and in a
high percentage of the cases had a very modest effect on punishments."'
The difference in the use of these enhancement laws in the two counties
involved prosecutorial efforts to use the "two-strikes" provisions for
enhancement of punishments for felony crimes. In Scott County, the
prosecutor made no use of the laws for this purpose (limiting his reliance
on this kind of enhancement to misdemeanor cases, as described above); in
Fayette County, the prosecutor filed charges under these laws in eight cases
(and in five of the eight employed other enhancement weapons to achieve
double enhancement), obtained enhanced convictions in six cases (double
enhancements in five), and in all six cases pushed felony punishments to
significantly higher levels."2
4. TraffickingNeara School.- This offense was heavily used in Scott County
(in eleven of the sixty-five drug cases or 18%), always for the purpose of
converting drug transactions involving marijuana and other low-grade
substances from misdemeanors to felonies. The transactions supporting
these prosecutions were different in one respect from the transactions used
in Fayette County to pursue such charges; in every case, the prosecution
was based upon an actual sale of drugs, while in most of the Fayette cases
(forty out of forty-two) prosecution was based on a possession of drugs with
intent to sell. The transactions involved in the Scott prosecutions were
identical to the ones involved in the Fayette prosecutions in a far more
209 See id.; see also Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
21o Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142; Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note i99.
211 In many of these cases, especially in Fayette County, the paraphernalia charge looked
like an add-on to more serious charges and simply disappeared in the plea bargaining process
without convictions; in those cases that produced convictions of the elevated offense, in both
counties punishment was almost always set at one year in prison rather than the punishment
that would have flowed from the misdemeanor offense (incarceration in the county jail for a
period of no more than twelve months).
212 In one case, the defendant was sentenced to five years in prison. In four cases defen-
dants were sentenced to ten years in prison. In another case, the defendant was sentenced to
more than ten years in prison.
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important respect; in not a single case was there any indication that the
defendant's conduct involved sales of drugs to school children or sales of
drugs on school grounds." 3
5. Double Counting.- The practice of double counting (alleging multiple
crimes by separating a drug episode into several parts) was substantially
less prominent in Scott County than it was in Fayette. In a few cases, the
double counting that occurred was similar though somewhat less aggressive
than the double counting that occurred in Fayette, such as these cases:
1. George Robinson I:4 He was found to be in possession of
marijuana plants (more than five plants), cocaine, and rolling papers.
He was charged with marijuana cultivation, cocaine possession,
paraphernalia possession, and second degree PFO. He pleaded
guilty to drug paraphernalia possession (all other charges were
dismissed), and was sentenced to serve twelve months in jail.
2. Buddy Wagner.1 5 He was stopped in a vehicle for drunk driving,
had in his possession some packaged marijuana and prescription
medications (Xanax and Oxycontin), was charged with trafficking
in marijuana and two counts of drug possession, entered pleas to
three counts of possession, and was sentenced to pretrial diversion
for two years.
3. William Hughes: 1 6 In a search of his home, he was found to be
in possession of cocaine, marijuana, and paraphernalia. He was
prosecuted for possession of cocaine, marijuana, and paraphernalia
(separate counts), pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and drug
paraphernalia, was sentenced to one year in prison, and was given
probation for three years conditioned upon drug treatment.
In most of the double counting cases in Scott County, defendants were
found in possession of marijuana (or cocaine) and paraphernalia needed for
use, were charged with possession of both, entered guilty pleas to one or
both charges, and were sentenced in most instances to no more than one
year in prison and usually less."1 7
213 See Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142; Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note 199.
214 Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. o2-CR-ooo55 (Ky. Scott Cir. Ct. Sept. 5,2003).
215 Commonwealth v. Wagner, No. o2-CR--ooo76 (Ky. Scott Cit. Ct. Jan. 6,2003).
216 Commonwealth v. Hughes, No. 03-CR--oo149 (Ky. Scott Cir. Ct. June 7, 2004).
217 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wise, No. oz-CR-ooo14 (Ky. Scott Cir. Ct. Feb. 2, 2002)
(defendant possessed marijuana, papers, baggies, and a pipe, was prosecuted for marijuana
possession and paraphernalia possession, pleaded guilty to both, and was sentenced to pre-
trial diversion); Commonwealth v. Burgess, No. 02-CR--oo 102 (Ky. Scott Cir. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003)
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6. Conclusion.- In more than ninety-eight percent of the drug prosecutions
in this study (sixty-four of sixty-five cases) defendants were convicted of
drug crimes, in all cases (sixty-four out of sixty-four) as a consequence of
guilty pleas by the defendants; in this regard, the results of the "drug laws at
work" in Scott were almost identical to the results in Fayette (where about
95% of the prosecutions ended with convictions)."1 8 But beyond this there
is little similarity in the results of the two studies. In two-thirds of the cases
in Scott that produced convictions (forty-one out of sixty-four), defendants
were sentenced to probation, conditional discharge, or pretrial diversion;
in the other twenty-three cases, defendants were sentenced to relatively
short periods in jail or prison (sixteen for no more than one year, five for
terms of five years in prison, and none for terms of more than five years). 19
In almost two-thirds of the Fayette cases that produced convictions (202
of 328), defendants were given terms of incarceration in prison or jail (for
more than one year in 125 cases); from this county, defendants were sent
to prison for at least five years (between five and ten) in sixty-seven cases,
were sent to prison for ten years in thirty cases, and were sent to prison for
more than ten years in three cases.
2 0
D. Conclusion
The defendants in these counties committed the same crimes, were
governed by the same criminal laws, and were called to task for their crimes
in the same judicial system (same rules, same protections, same decision
makers). They were entitled to equal justice under the law but were treated
instead to what is called "justice by geography" 2 ' (harsher punishment in
Fayette than in Scott for the exact same conduct). Such treatment casts a
dark cloud over the drug laws that support it and the justice system that
tolerates it.
The "justice by geography" exposed by the findings of these studies
is an unintended consequence of the many laws we have enacted under
an incarceration obsession and a blindness to the evils of unnecessary
punishment. The most significant change (and the most troubling) is
described in scholarly statements that are not meant to be complimentary:
The prosecution has seen its hand strengthened, making prosecutions
(defendant had marijuana and rolling papers in his car, was prosecuted for marijuana and para-
phernalia possession, pleaded guilty to both, and was sentenced to pretrial diversion).
218 See Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142; Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note 199.
219 Lawson, Scott Notes, supra note 199.
2zo Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
221 Samara Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study of San Diego County's Three Strikes
Sentencing Practices From July--December 1996, II STAN. L. & Po,'y REV. 29,41 (999).
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cheaper and trials less frequent and easier to win when they do occur. The
difficult decisions would be made not in courtrooms, but in the private




The overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system
... is the virtually absolute power the system has given prosecutors over
federal prosecution and sentencing. There is a lot of evidence. to support
this claim, but it can be demonstrated with one simple and awesome fact:
Everyone pleads guilty.
22 3
Defendants chose trial over bargaining in slightly less than 2% of the
cases in Scott County (one trial in sixty-five cases) and did the same in
about 4% of the cases in Fayette (fourteen trials in 344 cases). And in the
bargaining that determined the fate of so many defendants the weaponry
was overwhelmingly one-sided:
[C]riminal law and the law of sentencing define prosecutors' options, not
litigation outcomes. They are not rules in the shadow of which litigants
must bargain. Rather, they are items on a menu from which the prosecutor
may order as she wishes. She has no incentive to order the biggest meal
possible. Instead, her incentive is to get whatever meal she wants, as long
as the menu offers it. The menu does not define the meal; the diner does.
The law-on-the-street - the law that determines who goes to prison and for
how long - is chiefly written by prosecutors, not by legislators or judges."4
The drug laws provide an incredible array of weapons for drug prosecutions
(a very long menu), outcomes are determined first and foremost by the
aggressiveness with which the weapons are used, and, at least across
jurisdictional lines, those outcomes are absolutely sure to test the promise
of equal justice under the law.
IV. MEANINGFUL REFORM IDEAS
A. Introduction
From one end to the other, Kentucky's drug laws authorize punishments
that are harsh, disproportionate, and unprincipled. They have failed
222 Robert P Mosteller, New Dimensions in Sentencing Reform in the Twenly-First Century,
82 OR. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2oo3).
223 Marc L. Miller, Domination &Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv.
1211, 1252 (2004).
224 William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and CriminalLaw's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARv.
L. REv. 2548, 2549 (2004).
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miserably in their efforts to separate low- and high-level offenders from
each other for purposes of punishment and have opened the courthouse
doors to punishment disparities like the ones described in this Article.
With few exceptions, the drug laws (and the sentencing practices they
permit) need a complete and careful reexamination by parties committed
to fair, just, consistent, and necessary punishment, all with full appreciation
for a truth stated above and repeated here because of its great importance:
"The ... most powerful reform that must occur if we are to have any hope of
reversing the imprisonment binge is to reduce the severity of the sentences
[defendants] are given." ' 5  If committed to such reform, Kentucky's
lawmakers would have no difficulty finding ways to reduce sentences for
drug offenders without jeopardizing the safety, health, and general welfare
of the people.
B. Drug Quantity Sentencing
In its efforts to separate serious and less serious drug offenders, Kentucky
law distinguishes between "traffickers" and "possessors" (uniformly
punishing the former more severely than the latter) and then separately
distinguishes between drugs that are highly abusive and those that are
regarded as less abusive (punishing transactions involving the former more
severely than those that involve the latter). In so doing, it closely tracks the
law of other states. In one other way in which serious and less serious drug
offenders are separated, Kentucky's law fails to track the law of many, if not
most, states and, in that failure, misses what is perhaps the best chance of
distinguishing between abusers and petty distributors on the one hand and
profit-takers on the other.
The drug statutes of other states are full of models for what can be called
"drug quantity sentencing."2 6 The following approach from the drug laws
of Vermont is illustrative of how many states attempt to use this factor to
separate low- and high-level offenders for purposes of punishment:
Cocaine
1. Possession of any amount - maximum of 1 year.
2. Possession of 2.5 grams or more - maximum of 5 years.
3. Possession of 1 ounce or more - maximum of 10 years.
4. Possession 1 of pound or more - maximum of 20 years.
225 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 23.
226 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.4 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
37-2732B (zon0); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401 (West 2003), amended by zoo9 III. Legis.
Serv. 96-347 (West 2009); MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333-7403 (West 2001).
227 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4231(a) (2002).
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Depressants/Stimulantslm
1. Possession any amount - maximum of 1 year.
2. Possession of 100 times a benchmark unlawful dosage - maximum of 5
years.
3. Possession of 1000 times a benchmark unlawful dosage - maximum of
10 years.
4. Possession of 10,000 times a benchmark unlawful dosage - maximum of
20 years.
The intent is to provide adequate, predictable punishments for low-level
actors (users and petty distributors) and to target for enhanced punishments
those offenders who pose the greatest danger to society (punishments
proportionate to the conduct of defendants).
The Kentucky law uses "drug quantity sentencing" only for marijuana
crimes and even here makes no use of it for crimes of possession.2 9
Consequently, a possessor of cocaine is subject to the same penalty range
(one to five years or five to ten years for a second offense) without regard
to whether he possessed a mere trace of the drug 30 or one pound of it;
2 3 1
and a possessor of one of the lower level drugs (like Xanax) is subject
to the same penalty range (maximum of twelve months in jail or one to
five years in prison for a second offense) without regard to whether she
possessed one dose or 1,000 doses. 31 In this approach (which is also used
for the trafficking crimes), there is too much risk of excessive punishment,
too much potential for punishment disparities, and too much control over
punishment in the hands of the prosecution.
C. Penalty Enhancements
1. Introduction.- For most of four decades, we have chosen to err on the
harsh side in providing for the punishment of criminals; we have tended to
set penalties that fit atypical cases but then use them for run-of-the-mill
cases, resulting in more punishment than necessary in a large percentage
of cases. We have acted as though the harshness of punishment is all that
matters, have largely ignored reliable findings that "certainty of punishment
is more important than severity," 33 have veered away from the principle
that the punishment should fit the crime ("offenders should receive their
228 Id. tit. 18, § 4234(a) (amended 2009).
229 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 218A. 1421-.1423 (LexisNexis 2007).
230 It is well settled under Kentucky law that any amount of a drug, even a residue, is
enough for conviction of drug possession. See Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 223, 225
(Ky. 1977); Commonwealth v. Shivley, 814 S.W.2d 572, 573-74 (Ky. 1991).
231 Ste Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A. 14 15 (LexisNexis 2007).
232 See id. § 218A.1417.
233 Tonry, supra note 136, at 53.
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particular deserts - no more and no less""M), and, without regard for costs,
have enacted punishment provisions that deserve most of the blame for a
sevenfold increase in the state's inmate population. And in the drug law
area, we have engaged in these practices to the extreme, adopting ordinary
penalties that are anything but soft on drug offenders and then adding a
stream of enhancements that have pushed ordinary penalties to levels that
are exceptionally punitive, unwarranted, and unproductive.
2. PFO Enhancements.- The most lethal of the enhancement laws used
against drug offenders is one that is not even contained in the state's drug
statutes. It is located in the state's general penal code, 3 ' is called the
persistent felony offender law, and may have never been intended for use
to lengthen punishments for drug offenders. 3 6 The drug laws exist separate
and apart from the state's general criminal statutes and have their own
repeat offender provisions (as discussed below). Why would lawmakers
pull the drug laws from the coverage of the state's penal code (as they did
in 1972237) and then open the door to the use of a repeat offender provision
from that code after putting repeat offender provisions in the drug statutes?
Without answering (or even considering) this question, courts have allowed
the PFO law to be used against drug offenders. Legislators have concurred
through many years of silence, and state prosecutors have rushed through
the open door (with ninety-eight PFO prosecutions out of 344 drug cases
in Fayette County in one year).
3
1
A great deal of criticism has been leveled against repeat offender
statutes like the Kentucky version, 39 mostly because they reach far beyond
the especially dangerous and incorrigible offenders they once targeted.
2 4
0
234 Frase, Punishment Purposes, supra note 138, at 76.
235 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (LexisNexis 2008).
236 Drafters of the state's penal code made the following statement about what are
called "two-strikes" penalty provisions: "[Tihe proposed provisions [on drug crimes] contain
no specific reference to... separate penalty provisions for second offenses. It was felt that the
degree structure for offenses and penalties adequately treated these problems." Ky. CRIME
COMM'N & LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, KENTUCKY PENAL CODE FINAL DRAFT 291 (1971).
In other words, the penalty range for cocaine possession would be one to five years in prison, a
range that is wide enough to provide for harsher punishments for repeat offenders (one or two
years for the first offense and four or five years for the second offense), and that eliminates the
need for an enhanced punishment of repeat offenders.
237 See supra note 2o and accompanying text.
238 See Lawson, Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
239 See Lawson, supra note 27.
240 Ky. CRIME COMM'N & LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, supra note 236, at 348. Drafters
of the original version of Kentucky's law described it as a "last resort idea". Id. They also took
great care to guarantee that the law would be used rarely and not routinely (only against de-
fendants convicted twice and incarcerated twice for felony crimes before committing a third
felony). See Lawson, supra note 27, at I 1-1 2.
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Unlike the PFO laws of many, if not most states, 4' the Kentucky statute
casts a penalty enhancement net over a huge pool of repeat offenders (all
who commit a felony crime after one felony conviction) and deserves much
credit or blame for the state's inmate explosion:
The long reach of this law absolutely guarantees inmate population
growth and resulting stress for prisons and jails. It once produced a mere
handful of inmates saddled with long sentences (79 in year 1980) but now
delivers a handful of such inmates to the corrections system every week of
every month of every year (with a cumulative total of 4187 by year 2004);
and its impact extends beyond the numbers who arrive in the system as
PFO inmates to include an untold number who accept higher than normal
penalties in return for dismissal of PFO charges. It can be used against
violent offenders (who would qualify for severe punishment without the
law) but is far more likely to be used against felony offenders who pose
very little if any threat to public safety (shoplifters, auto thieves, low-level
burglars, drug users, etc.).
2 42
There are a few drug offenders who need and deserve very harsh
punishment and there are many who do not. The PFO law applies to
both groups, produces punishment that is more severe than necessary, and
pushes the risk of disparity in sentencing to a much higher level. Most
importantly, it puts into the hands of prosecutors more ultimate power
over punishment than they should have. Punishment is too important to
depend upon whether a given defendant faces aggressive or unaggressive
use of the PFO law, and for that reason alone it should be removed from the
sentencing menu in drug prosecutions. This is especially so since penalty
enhancement of repeat drug offenders is addressed in the drug statutes
themselves.
3. "Two-Strikes" Drug Laws.- The drug statutes are literally full of repeat
offender provisions like the PFO law: so-called "second or subsequent
offense" provisions ("two-strikes") that elevate penalties for drug offenders
who have prior convictions for drug offenses. Like the PFO law, these "two-
strikes provisions" are capable of producing disproportionate, unnecessary,
and uneven punishment. These laws will need to be reexamined by
lawmakers if there is to be meaningful reductions in sentence severity
for drug offenders. There are several issues that will need to be included
within this reexamination, the most important of which is whether or not
241 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-4 o (West 2007) (enhancements only for offend-
ers charged with dangerous crimes after convictions for dangerous crimes); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-50-2-8.5 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008) (enhancements only for offenders charged with
violent crimes after convictions for violent crimes); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (2008).
242 Lawson, supra note 27, at 31 (emphasis added).
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indiscriminate punishment enhancement for repeat offenders (which is
close to what the law now provides) is consistent with sensible sentencing
policies and objectives.
The existing law defines a repeat offender nearly as liberally as it can
be defined '43 and then uses that definition for the penalty enhancement
of virtually all drug crimes (except for possession of marijuana4 ). It is
inclusive enough to allow for the use of misdemeanor convictions to enhance
penalties for felony crimes. For example, a conviction for possession of
drug paraphernalia (punishable by no more than twelve months in jail in
Kentucky 45 and no more than thirty days in jail in Wisconsin2 46) can be
used under Kentucky law to enhance the crime of cocaine possession (from
ordinary penalties of one to five years to enhanced penalties of five to ten
years). 47 It is also inclusive enough to allow for a prior conviction involving
a lowly abusive drug to be used to enhance penalties for a conviction
involving a highly abusive drug; for instance, a conviction for possession of
a depressant drug from Schedule IV or V (punishable as a misdemeanor")
can be used for enhancement of penalties for possession of a highly abusive
drug like heroin or cocaine (elevating one to five years in prison to five to
ten years 49) and a prior conviction for trafficking in marijuana (punishable
as a misdemeanor for small amounts5 0 ) can be used to enhance already
very high penalties for trafficking in heroin or cocaine (elevating a five to
ten years penalty range to a ten to twenty years range).25 ' In one respect,
the General Assembly attempted to avoid the kind of indiscriminate
enhancement described above; it prohibited the use of drug possession
convictions to enhance drug trafficking convictions52 but then lost much
of the benefit of that prohibition through a silent approval of the use of the
PFO law for penalty enhancement in drug cases. 53
243 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.oio(3 5 ) (LexisNexis 2007) ("[Flor the purposes of
this chapter an offense is considered as a second or subsequent offense, if, prior to his convic-
tion of the offense, the offender has at any time been convicted under this chapter, or under
any statute of the United States, or of any state relating to substances classified as controlled
substances ... , except that a prior conviction for a nontrafficking offense shall be treated as a
prior offense only when the subsequent offense is a nontrafficking offense.").
244 Seeid. § 218A.1422.
245 See id. § 218A.5oo(5).
246 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 961.573() (West 2007).
247 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1416(2) (LexisNexis 2007).
248 Id. § I8A.1417(2)(a).
249 See id. § 218A.1415(2).
250 Id. § 218A.1421(2).
251 See id. § 218A.1412(2).
252 See id. § 218A.o o(35) (defining "second and subsequent offense").
253 For example, a conviction of cocaine possession (a Class D felony) could not be used
under the "two-strikes" provisions of the drug laws to elevate penalties for cocaine trafficking;
but since the first conviction is for a felony crime it can be used under the PFO law to enhance
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In their pursuit of the long "war on drugs," state lawmakers have taken
the easy route in dealing with repeat drug offenders, choosing to elevate
penalties on virtually all repeat offenders rather than striving to identify
the ones who pose the greatest danger to public safety. In this regard,
they have followed the lead of some of our sister states" but have ignored
the efforts of others to engage in a more discriminating use of "second or
subsequent offense" enhancement in drug cases. In Virginia, for instance,
the drug laws contain repeat offender enhancement for traffickers"'5 but not
possessors. 5 6 In New York, the statutes provide for penalty enhancement
of repeat offenders charged with drug felonies but not those charged with
drug misdemeanors.5 7 In Iowa, there is penalty enhancement for traffickers
convicted of a second drug offense but enhancement for possessors only
upon a conviction of a third offense.5 8 In Colorado, the drug laws allow
for penalty enhancements for repeat offenders but not for prior drug
convictions of a magnitude that is below that of the charged offense.5 9
There is a better separation of serious and non-serious offenders in these
laws than under Kentucky's law. There is a rejection of the assumption
that extraordinary punishment is necessary and warranted for virtually
all repeat drug offenders, and most importantly there is recognition of a
need to direct more of our limited law enforcement resources at those who
promote and perpetuate the drug epidemic for purposes of personal profit.
In assessing the worth and wisdom of the many "two-strikes" provisions
of Kentucky's drug laws, there is a need for renewed appreciation of the
fundamentals of sentencing under the system that has been used in this
state since 1974:
In using penalty ranges for sentencing, the 1974 Code was designed to
promote proportionality.., without depriving sentencing authorities of the
flexibility needed for proper consideration of matters peculiar to individual
offenders (age, employment history, drug and alcohol use, mental capacity,
etc.) and, most importantly, criminal histories. In every felony classification, the
penally range was [and still is] wide enough for a separation of high and low rate
the penalties of any other felony crime (in this instance trafficking).
254 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 57o/4o8 (West 2003); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
3 18--B:27 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2008).
255 See VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-248 (2OO9).
256 See id. § 18.2-250; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 37-2732, 3 7-2732B (2002 & Supp.
2oo8); UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 413,9 U.L.A. 778-79 (1994).
257 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.04, 70.70 (McKinney 2009).
258 IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.411 (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.401(5) (West 2007 &
Supp. 2009). See also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453.336 (2007) (no enhancement for second convic-
tion but enhancement for third and fourth convictions).
259 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-18-405 to-406 (2oo8). See also MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 94C, §§
3 z(b), 32E (LexisNexis 1995).
2009-2010]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
offenders andfor significantly harsher punishment for deserving repeat offenders."
If one year in prison is enough for a first-time cocaine possessor and five
years is possible for a second time possessor without any enhancement
(one to five years for a Class D felon), what is the need and justification for
a provision authorizing a ten-year sentence for the latter? This we must
ask about every "two-strikes" law in the drug statutes if there is to be
meaningful reform of the state's drug laws.
4. Firearm Possession.- All drugcrimes are enhanced one level if defendants
possess firearms during and in furtherance of the offense (misdemeanors
become felonies, Class D felonies become Class C felonies, etc.)).61 Those
in support of firearm enhancements argue that such defendants are more
culpable and dangerous than those who commit drug crimes without firearms
and thus need and deserve harsher punishments (like armed robbers 6 and
armed burglars 63). Opponents of such enhancements argue that there are
weapons crimes already punishing the defendant's possession of firearms'
6
and that the connection between drug activity and firearm possession is too
tentative and insignificant to affect punishment (e.g., cocaine possessors
and heroin traffickers need no firearms to complete their crimes).
As now construed, 65 the authorizing statute requires no use of the
firearm in the commission of the offense. In the prosecutions described
in Part IV above,266 prosecutors and judges used the statute mostly, if not
exclusively, to elevate punishments for drug possessors who were found
to be simultaneously in possession of drugs and firearms in either an
automobile or a residence (with firearm possession hardly connected to
the drug offense at all and creating the appearance of an excuse, rather
than a reason, for punishment enhancement). As it now exists (even with
the "in furtherance of the offense" words the legislature added in 2005),
prosecutors are far more likely to use the statute to pressure defendants
into plea bargaining rather than to support higher punishments that the use
of a weapon in the commission of a drug crime justifies.
Many and probably most states have steered clear of penalty
enhancement for firearm possession, perhaps out of concern for overuse
and abuse. 67 Many of those that have not steered clear of the enhancement
26o Lawson, supra note 27, at 1o (emphasis added).
261 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 218A.992 (LexisNexis 2007).
262 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515.020 (LexisNexis 2oo8).
263 Id. § 51i.ozo.
264 See, e.g., id. § 527.020 (carrying concealed deadly weapon); id. § 527.040 (possession
of firearm by convicted felon).
265 See discussion and sources cited supra note 178.
266 See supra text accompanying notes 170-78.
267 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 1i.7 .oio-. 9 O(zoo8);ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3401 to-
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have attempted to provide safeguards against misuse. In California, for
example, the law limits this kind of enhancement to drug activities involving
only the most dangerous of drugs (e.g., heroin and methamphetamine)
and then requires a showing that the defendant had the firearm "available
for immediate offensive or defensive use."216 In North Dakota, the law
requires a showing that the defendant had the firearm in his or her "actual
possession at the time of the offense."2 69 In Utah, the law requires a
showing that a firearm "was used, carried, or possessed on [defendant's]
person or in his immediate possession" during commission of the offense.270
And in Maryland, the law provides for enhancement of penalties only for
trafficking crimes and only when it is shown that the firearm had a "nexus
to the drug trafficking" or was used, worn, carried, or transported by the
defendant.271 There are some assurances in these laws that the firearm
will be more than a mere coincidence of the drug crime (more than a mere
"excuse" for harsher punishment of drug offenders), assurances that the
Kentucky statute is missing and that the legislature needs to add if they
intend to retain firearm enhancement at all.
D. Double Counting
The problem of double counting, or punishing one offense as though
it were two, is especially prominent in the drug crime area. A defendant
is subject to multiple charges, multiple convictions and, in most instances,
multiple punishments if he or she possesses multiple drugs when caught,
sells multiple drugs in one transaction, or sells drugs on successive days
to one undercover police officer. Double counting is more likely to
thwart than advance sentencing objectives, produces punishment that is
disproportionate to both the culpability of defendants and the seriousness
of their conduct, and adds to the great difficulty of imposing consistent
punishments among defendants;272 above all else, it increases the
3422 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ i8-i8-ioi to -605 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21a-240
to -328 (West 2o06); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, §§ 1-48 (LexisNexis 1995); N.Y PENAL LAW §§
220.00-221.55 (McKinney 2009).
268 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.1 (West 2007). See also IND. CODE ANN. §§
35-48-4-6 to -7 (LexisNexis 2004) (limiting gun enhancement to crimes involving only the
most abusive drugs).
269 N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23.1 (1997).
270 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37--8 (2007).
271 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5.621-622 (LexisNexis 2002). Seealso ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. I7-A, §§ 1105-A, 1107-A (2oo6) (allowing gun enhancement for drug manufactur-
ing crimes but not possession crimes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.7401c, 333.7403 (West
2001) (allowing gun enhancement for drug manufacturing crimes but not possession crimes);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.401 (West 2007) (allowing gun enhancement in trafficking crimes
where defendant had "immediate possession or control of a firearm").
272 Cone, supra note 119, at 1384-85 ("Double counting results in patently unfair pun-
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prosecution's already enormous power to determine sentencing outcomes
and robs the justice system of basic principles and policies that ought to
govern the incarceration of citizens.
Most legislatures (here and elsewhere) have tilted toward letting courts
deal with the question of what constitutes (or does not constitute) an offense
and whether or not one course of conduct can be divided into multiple
offenses. The practice of double counting has generally flourished under
court decisions rendered in this state (especially in drug prosecutions), 73
and the General Assembly will need to give it some attention if double
counting is determined to be unacceptable. In looking for guidance on this
important issue, lawmakers might find some appeal in discarded Kentucky
case law that governed the issue during most of the twentieth century, case
law in which the state's high court formulated a yardstick ("one impulse")
that one may refine and convert into a statutory prohibition against
punishing single acts as though they are two (or three or four) acts. They
might also find some appeal in a provision contained in the drug laws of
Texas that requires concurrent sentencing for multiple crimes arising out
of a "criminal episode" if prosecuted in a single action.
7 4
E. Trafficking Near a School
1. Introduction.- For good and obvious reasons, the state's lawmakers have
targeted schoolchildren for special protection from drug dealers. They
have drawn an exceedingly wide circle around schools (so-called "drug free
zones") and have created a special felony offense for all trafficking activity
that occurs within the zone ("trafficking near a school"). 75 In pursuit of this
sound objective, they have created an offense that extends far beyond its
legitimate purpose (as described earlier in this article) and have delivered
to the prosecution a weapon that they will almost surely use (and misuse)
to enhance punishments for low-level drug offenders.
When one transfers drugs to any person within the "drug free zone"
(not just school children), they commit an offense. This offense covers
possession of drugs with intent to transfer and extends to all types of illegal
drugs (highly and lowly abusive alike). The offense is punished in a way
that renders it totally insignificant to high-level drug offenders (traffickers
in drugs like heroin, cocaine and the like) 7 6 and that makes it especially
ishment for individual defendants. It also causes disparate punishments for like-situated
offenders.").
273 See supra notes i 16-31 and accompanying text.
274 Tl~x. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.I32 (Vernon 2003) (where "criminal epi-
sode" is defined to include multiple offenses from one transaction as well as multiple offenses
that repeat the commission of the same or similar offense).
275 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1411 (LexisNexis 2007).
276 It is punished as a Class D felony (one to five years in prison) unless there is a more
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harsh for low-level drug offenders (traffickers in the lowly abusive drugs
found in Schedules IV and V and small amounts of marijuana)."' It looks
on its face like a crime that is aimed at drug distributors but in its real-life
application strikes almost exclusively at drug possessors (mostly possessors
with quantities more suitable for personal use than distribution), as was
so clearly shown by the field studies described in Part IV above. It has
flaws that the legislature can easily fix without jeopardizing the legitimate
objective of protecting school children from drug dealers.
2. Drug Free School Zone.- The drug laws of Kentucky provide for the
widest "drug free school zone" in America - 1000 yards from any building
used for classroom instruction (which is wide enough to cover most areas
of sizeable cities). The drug laws of many states, probably a majority, use
1000 feet to describe the protected zone around schools (consistent with a
provision in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 78), although a number
of states have adopted a smaller zone in order to avoid abusive use of the
offense. For example, in Vermont the protected zone includes only school
grounds and school buses, 7 9 in Arizona the zone is an "area within three
hundred feet of a school,"2 and in Alaska 8' and Wyoming"2 it includes
areas within 500 feet of school grounds. A reduction in the protected zone,
to at least lO00feet, would provide some protection against overuse of the
Kentucky offense but not enough to remedy the problems the field studies
described above reveal.
3. Exclusions/Defenses.- In its use, the Kentucky statute is made to look
like an "excuse" rather than a "reason" for higher punishment by extending
its coverage to defendants who possess drugs inside a personal residence
located within the "drug free school zone" or inside an automobile that is
stopped by police within that drug free zone.z83 In order to protect against
severe penalty for a defendant's conduct in another part of the drug laws, which would always
be the case for those who traffic in drugs found in Schedules I and II. See id. §§ 218A.1411,
.1412.
277 Low-level trafficking is classified as a Class A misdemeanor (maximum of twelve
months in jail) but if committed within the drug free zone around schools is classified as a
Class D felony (giving defendants a five-fold increase in punishment at the high end of the
penalty range). See id. §§ 218A. 1411, .1414.
278 See UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCEs AcT § 409,9 U.L.A. 712 (994).
279 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4237 (2002).
z8o ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. § 13-3411(I)(i) (2001). Seealso MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15Z.01(14a)(2)
(West 2005) ("300 feet or one city block"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.07.1 (2002) ("within
three hundred (300) yards").
281 ALAsKA STAT. § 11 I.7030(a)(3) (2008).
282 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-1o36(b) (2oo9).
283 As described in Part IV of this Article, the offense was very heavily used in Fayette
County (forty-two cases out of 344 drug prosecutions), and in most cases it was used to obtain
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this perceived misuse of the offense, a substantial number of states exclude
from their coverage drug activities that occur within the protected zone
but inside the private residence of a defendant (some only if there was at
the time of the act no minor present and others only if there was no profit
involved in the defendant's activity),2" while some other states exclude
acts of mere drug possession and punish only actual sales and transfers that
occur within the protected zone.285 At least one state has excluded acts that
occur within a school zone because of actions of the police (such as drug
possession in a car stopped for purposes of making an arrest).
2 86
4. Conclusion.- With a significant reduction in the size of the protected
zone and adoption of exclusions for possessors of drugs in private residences
and vehicles, the Kentucky offense would be true to its name (trafficking
near a school) and fully compatible with the purpose for which it exists (the
protection of school children from drug dealers). It would be more than a
mere excuse for harsher punishment of drug offenders.
F Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
None of the drug law's offenses were used more routinely than this
one in the drug prosecutions described in Part IV above (used in almost
one-third of the drug prosecutions in Fayette County in 2003).287 The
defining statute criminalizes both possession of drug paraphernalia for
personal use and possession for the manufacture or delivery, and adopts
a single penalty range for both types of violators (twelve months in jail or
one to five years in prison for offenders with prior drug convictions). 288 So
convictions of defendants possessing drugs at home or in a stopped vehicle, with the "school
zone" being nothing but a coincidence of the defendant's conduct. See Lawson, Fayette
Notes, supra note 142.
284 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.71.030(b) (2008) (no profit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
4767(d) (2003) (no profit); GA. CODE ANN. § i6-13-32.4(g) (2007) (no person under seventeen
present and no profit); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4o:981.3(D) (2001 & Supp. 2009) (no person
seventeen or under present); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45--9-o109(4) (2007) (no person seventeen or
under present); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 2005) (no person seventeen or under present
and no profit); Tx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481. 134 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2009) (no
minor present). See also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 550/5.2(a) (West 2003) ("on any public way"
within i,ooo feet of school).
285 See, e.g., N.Y PENAL Law § 220.44 (McKinney 2008) (requiring sales); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 19-03.1-23.1(I)(a) (1997 & Supp. 2009) (requiring manufacture or distribution); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 475.848, .852, .858, .878, .882, .904 (2007) ("manufacture" or "delivery"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 21-28-4.07.1 (2002) ("distributing or manufacturing").
286 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-4-I6(c) (LexisNexis 2004) ("at the request or suggestion of
a law enforcement officer").
287 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.




defined, it is almost always committed by defendants who possess illegal
drugs and thus opens the door to multiple charges and multiple convictions
for single acts of drug possession. It reaches farther and punishes harder
than many of its counterparts in the drug laws of others states, and it could
benefit from some protections against overuse by aggressive prosecutors
and against punishments that are duplicative in many cases and excessive
in most.
Lawmakers could draw two valuable components from the
paraphernalia possession laws of other states that would fix most, if not
all, of the shortcomings of the Kentucky statute. The first would involve a
reduction in coverage of the statute through the adoption of an exclusion
for persons who are in possession of paraphernalia for purposes of drug use.
Believing that such persons are adequately punished by drug possession
statutes, a growing number of states limit the coverage of the offense to
persons who are found to be involved in either the manufacture or delivery
of paraphernalia (aiming the statute at those who are involved in drug
activities for profit)." 9 The second would involve reduced punishments for
the paraphernalia possession offense that would bring Kentucky's law in line
with punishments found in the paraphernalia laws of other states. In some
states the offense is punished by fine or short incarcerations (especially in
those that have no exclusion for persons possessing for use only),2g° and in
many (if not most) of the others it is punished at substantially lower levels
than in Kentucky (especially for Kentucky offenders who have earlier drug
convictions), 91 Not much of the incentive to overuse the Kentucky statute
would survive the adoption of either of these changes.
G. Others
The drug law reform agenda could easily be expanded beyond the one
289 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364.7 (West 2007); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
94C, § 321 (LexisNexis 2009); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7453 (West zooi); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 318-B:2(II)-(IV) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. zoo8); R.I. GEN. LAws § 21-28.5-2
(20o2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4476 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-265.3 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-7-1o56 (2oo9).
290 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § i I I-A(4) (2006 & Supp. zoo8) (fine only for
use and six months for trafficking or furnishing); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-441 to -442 (zoo8) (fine
for use and six months for delivery); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 961.573-.574 (West 2007) (thirty days
for use and ninety days for manufacture or delivery).
291 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-267 (West zoo6) (three months for use and twelve
months for delivery or manufacture); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.092-093 (West 2005) (pet-
ty misdemeanor for use and misdemeanor for delivery or manufacture); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2C:36-2 to :36-3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (fine for use and eighteen months for dispense or
manufacture); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-42A-3 to -4 (1998) (thirty days for use and two years
for delivery); "-x. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 48 1. 125 (Vernon 2003) (fine for use and one
year for delivery or manufacture); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (2007) (six months for use and
one year for manufacture or delivery).
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discussed above. For example, there is a need at some point to examine
the widespread practice of charging offenders with drug trafficking on the
basis of possession of drugs with intent to sell or transfer, a charge that
can be easily made in cases in which the quantity of drugs possessed by
defendants is exceedingly small."' 2 A second item that needs to be on a
reform agenda at some point involves the penalty (or penalty structure) for
offenders found in possession of small amounts of marijuana. The offense
is already one of the state's least serious offenses (being one of the few
crimes exempt from enhanced punishment for repeat offenders), 93 but still
carries a punishment that is out of line with penalties imposed on such
offenders in many if not most states."'
V. CONCLUSION
With a pause or two along the way, lawmakers have toughened
Kentucky's drug laws for more than thirty years, always believing that
tougher punishment would curtail the illegal drug epidemic. They have had
unqualified public support for this strategy, have worried little if any (until
recently) about the monetary and human costs of harsher punishments,
have shown minimal appreciation at best for the real "punitive-ness" of
prison and jail incarceration, and have not been deterred by the existence
of overcrowded and difficult conditions in correctional facilities. They
have seen a serious drain on the state's treasury, worsening conditions in
the state's prisons and jails, and very marginal effects if any on the state's
drug problem. Yet, they have spoken very softly about the need for change,
292 For example, trafficking charges were filed in Fayette Circuit Court in 212 cases (out
of a total of 344 prosecutions) and in a full two-thirds of those cases the charge was based not
on a sale of drugs but on possession with intent to sell or transfer, and in some if not many of
those cases the quantity of drugs possessed by defendants was not substantial. See Lawson,
Fayette Notes, supra note 142.
293 The offense is classified as a Class A misdemeanor (carrying up to twelve months in
jail and a $500 fine) but under certain circumstances can become a felony crime (with one to
five years in prison). As discussed in Part IV above, possession of marijuana seems regularly
to be used in support of the offense of trafficking near a school (a Class D felony). See supra
notes 181--85 and accompanying text.
294 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009) ($1OO fine
for possession of 28.5 grams or less and maximum of six months for possession of more than
28.5 grams); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-406 (2OO8) ($ioo fine for possession of one ounce and
$IOO fine and fifteen days in jail for possession of more than one but less than eight ounces);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 453.336 (2007) ($600 fine for possession of one ounce or less, $1,ooo fine for
a second offense, and no more than one year in jail for third offense); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05
(McKinney 2008) ($ioo fine for first offense, $200 fine for second offense, and $250 fine and
fifteen days in jail for third offense); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.864 (2007) (fine of $500 to $1,OOO for
possession of less than one ounce); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370 (2ooz & Supp. 2008) ($200
fine and thirty days for possession of one ounce); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250.1 (2009) ($500 and
thirty days for first offense, and $2,500 and twelve months for second offense).
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if at all, and have shown very little enthusiasm for a significantly different
strategy.
They have provided for some drug treatment of state inmates in a
few county jails, have expanded drug courts to some extent, have taken
some action to encourage pre-trial diversion of drug offenders (in return
for drug treatment), and have loosened some restrictions on parole. But
they have changed virtually none of the tough laws enacted during the
thirty-year-old "war on drugs," leaving intact a set of laws that has flooded
the corrections system with non-violent offenders and that has contributed
to a state budget that currently rests on the outer edge of fiscal disaster.
What these laws have done (and what they are capable of doing) is vividly
revealed by data obtained from the state 95 and charted in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1
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For perspective on these numbers (especially the tripling of the drug
inmate population in just fifteen years), it is worth knowing that during the
onset of the drug war in the early 1970s, the state had about 3000 inmates
in its prison system' 96 and not enough drug offenders to even take notice.
Now, as I write, the state has 21,565 inmates2 97 (seven times as many) and a
drug inmate population of about 5000198 (enough to fill every bed in five of
295 E-mail from Craig Thatcher, IT Branch Manager, Kentucky Department of
Corrections, to Robert G. Lawson, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law
(July 10, 2009, 12:18 EST) (on file with author).
296 Lawson, supra note 17, at 325.
297 Ky. DEP'T OF CoRR., supra note 29.
298 No one should be misled by the drug inmate number for year 2009 (showing 4833
drug inmates), for it reflects a reduction attributable solely to the fact that the state engaged in
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the state's prisons - Blackburn, Green River, Luther Luckett, Little Sandy,
and Northpoint before its destruction by fire). And, as shown by recent
data from the Corrections Department 29 and charted in Figure 2 below,
the state has growth in the drug offender part of its inmate population that
is not matched by any other:3°°
Figure 2
Drug Offenders in Inmate Population
(Percentages) - 1995-2009
30
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The words "budgetary heedlessness ' 30 1 might be fairly descriptive of
this development, an expenditure of as much as $100 million per year for
incarceration of 5000 inmates consisting mostly of drug users and marginal
participants in the drug business in return for uncertain benefits at best
(maybe in return for more harm than help).
In all probability, if we stay mad at drug offenders for another decade,
the 5000 number will become 6000 and then 7000 and then more, and the
$100 million in incarceration costs will jump to $150 million and beyond.
Maybe, in these numbers and predictions, we can find a way to admit that
we lost our way in the fight against drug abuse, that we enacted laws and
policies that have overloaded our prisons and jails with people who have
done more harm to themselves than others, and that we live with a drug
epidemic that is probably worse than when we began. A more productive
step toward drug law reforms that would matter might be hard to find.
an early release program driven by a budget crisis of unprecedented proportions.
299 E-mail from Craig Thatcher, IT Branch Manager, Kentucky Department of
Corrections, to Robert G. Lawson, Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law
(July 10, 2009, 11:40 EST) (on file with author).
300 Id. (violent offenders dropped from 38% to 36% of the total population during the
period from 1995 to 2009, sex offenders dropped from 12% to io%, property offenders dropped
from 26% to 24%, and other offenders dropped from ii % to 6%).
301 Frank 0. Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal
Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 253 (2005).
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done more harm to themselves than others, and that we live with a drug
epidemic that is probably worse than when we began. A more productive
step toward drug law reforms that would matter might be hard to find.

